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CRIMINAL LAW 
AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE: PERCEPTIONS OF 
INFLUENCE IN INSURANCE FRAUD 
PROSECUTIONS AND THE NEED FOR 
REAL SAFEGUARDS 
AVIVA ABRAMOVSKY* 
This Article examines the working relationship between the insurance 
industry andprosecutorsin the insurancefraudprosecutioncontext. Both 
informal and legislatively mandated relationships are examined and 
funding schemes reviewed. The Article argues that specialized funding of 
investigatorsandprosecutorsby industry assessment has led to perceptions 
of industry influence on the impartialityof the prosecutor. The Article then 
reviews the capacity of perceived influence to chill tort plaintiff lawyer 
activity. The Article concludes that the potentialfor conflict exists and is 
sufficient to warrant due process consideration. Additionally, the Article 
offers suggestionsfor potentialprophylacticproceduralsafeguards in the 
course of prosecuting lawyers for their representative actions in the 
insurancefraudcontext. 
* Aviva Abramovsky is an Associate Professor of Syracuse University College of Law. 
This Article is dedicated to the memory of her father, Abraham Abramovsky, Professor of 
Law, Fordham University. His life was an inspiration and his work a blessing. May this 
Article continue his work for the advancement of the criminal law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past three decades, most state legislatures' have enacted 
2 
criminal statutes specifically targeted at deterring insurance fraud.3 Unlike 
most criminal statutes, these insurance fraud laws not only delineate the 
unlawful conduct sought to be deterred, but also generally restrict the scope 
of potential victims to insurance carriers. 4 The expressed intent of the new 
1Not coincidentally, insurance companies are a major lobbying presence in state 
capitals. See John Dunbar, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, "Big Insurance" Industry Dominates State 
Legislatures, Oct. 12, 2000, http://www.publicintegrity.org/report.aspx?aid=462 (reporting 
that there are 1972 insurance companies or associations that lobby state legislatures, or one 
lobbying interest per every three state lawmakers). Reflecting industry interest in insurance 
fraud prosecutions, industry organizations monitor the budgets, staffing, referral, and 
conviction rates ofthe various state Insurance Fraud Bureaus. See, e.g., COALITION AGAINST 
INSURANCE FRAUD, STATE INSURANCE FRAUD BUREAUS: A PROGRESS REPORT: 2001 TO 2006 
(2007), availableat www.insurancefraud.org/downloads/ fraudbureaureport06.pdf. 
2 Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have passed some form of criminal 
insurance fraud statute. See Insurance Information Institute, Issues Update, Feb. 2008, 
http://www.iii.org/mediaihottopics/insurance/fraud. All forty-eight states with particularized 
insurance fraud statutes make the filing of a false claim with an insurance company a crime. 
See id. Only two states-Oregon and Virginia-have not. See id. Oregon has a criminal 
insurance fraud statute pending in its legislature. See H.R. 3162, 74th Sess. (Ore. 2007), 
available at www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/measpdf/hb3 I00.dir/hb3162.intro.pdf. 
Those forty-eight states with various criminal insurance fraud statutes likewise have 
various forms of immunity laws passed in relation to these fraud statutes which limit civil 
actions otherwise likely available to policyholders for actions based on the release of their 
claims information. See Insurance Information Institute, supra. The Insurance Information 
Institute explains the importance of immunity laws as follows: 
Privacy laws protect the rights of policyholders and claimants against the release of information 
considered confidential. However, to successfully bring a case to trial, insurers must be able to 
provide information to prosecutors on individuals suspected of fraud. Immunity laws that allow 
insurance companies to report information without fear ofcriminal or civil prosecution now exist 
in all states, but ... many are limited. 
Id. 
3 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.234(1) (1987), which states in pertinent part, 
(1)(a) A person commits insurance fraud ... if that person, with the intent to injure, defraud or 
deceive any insurer ... (2) Prepares or makes any written or oral statement that is intended to be 
presented to any insurance company in connection with, or in support of, any claim for payment 
or other benefit pursuant to an insurance policy, knowing that such statement contains any false, 
incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim.., is 
guilty of a felony in the third degree. 
4 Some statutes define the potential victim class slightly more broadly to include the state 
or local governments and self-insurance and other commercial programs. See, e.g., N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 176.05 (Consol. 2007). Insurance fraud is defined as: 
1. A fraudulent insurance act is committed by any person who, knowingly and with intent to 
defraud presents, causes to be presented, or prepares with knowledge or belief that it will be 
presented to or by an insurer, self insurer, or purported insurer, or purported self insurer, or any 
agent thereof, any written statement as part of, or in support of, an application for the issuance 
of, or the rating ofa commercial insurance policy, or certificate or evidence of self insurance for 
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legislation was to provide a specific vehicle for the prosecution of those 
who attempted to or actually filed false, fraudulent, or exaggerated claims 
with their insurance companies.5 In addition to deterring future offenders, 
legislators hoped that these statutes would result in a public benefit of 
smaller insurance premiums.6 
commercial insurance or commercial self insurance, or a claim for payment or other benefit 
pursuant to an insurance policy or self insurance program for commercial or personal insurance 
which he knows to: (i) contain materially false information concerning any fact material thereto; 
or (ii) conceal, for the purpose ofmisleading, information concerning any fact material thereto. 
Id. 
5 Efficiency in the prosecution of insurance fraud crimes is among the avowed express 
interests of legislatures in enacting specific insurance fraud statutes. See, for example, 
Findings, Declarations Relative to Insurance Fraud, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:21-4.4 (West 
2008), which states: 
[T]he Legislature finds and declares: 
a. Insurance fraud is inimical to public safety, welfare and order within the State of New 
Jersey. Insurance fraud is pervasive and expensive, costing consumers and businesses 
millions of dollars in direct and indirect losses each year. Insurance fraud increases 
insurance premiums, to the detriment of individual policyholders, small businesses, large 
corporations and governmental entities. All New Jerseyans ultimately bear the societal 
burdens and costs caused by those who commit insurance fraud. 
b. The problem of insurance fraud must be confronted aggressively by facilitating the 
detection, investigation and prosecution of such misconduct, as well as by reducing its 
occurrence and achieving deterrence through the implementation of measures that more 
precisely target specific conduct constituting insurance fraud. 
c. To enable more efficient prosecution of criminally culpable persons who knowingly 
commit or assist or conspire with others in committing fraud against insurance companies, it 
is necessary to establish a crime of "insurance fraud" to directly and comprehensively 
criminalize this type of harmful conduct, with substantial criminal penalties to punish 
wrongdoers and to appropriately deter others from such illicit activity. 
d. In addition to criminal penalties, in order to maintain the public trust and ensure the 
integrity of professional licensees and certificate-holders who by virtue of their professions 
are involved in insurance transactions, it is appropriate to provide civil remedial provisions 
governing license or certificate forfeiture and suspension tailored to this new crime of 
insurance fraud and other criminal insurance-related activities. 
e. To enhance the State's ability to detect insurance fraud, which will lead to more 
productive investigations and, ultimately, more successful criminal prosecutions, it is 
appropriate to provide members of the public with significant incentives to come forward 
when they may have reasonable suspicions or knowledge of a person or persons committing 
insurance fraud. The establishment of an Insurance Fraud Detection Reward Program will 
enable the Insurance Fraud Prosecutor to obtain information which may lead to the arrest, 
prosecution and conviction of persons or entities who have committed insurance-related 
fraud. 
6 See id. The stakes are undoubtedly high: insurance is a multi-trillion-dollar industry. 
See U.S. Securities and Insurance Industries: Keeping the Promise,Hearing of the House 
Fin. Serv. Comm., 107th Cong. 61 (2001) (quoting a release from the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners stating that the industry "is an $850 billion industry with assets 
of over $3 trillion"). To put that number in perspective, in 2002, Swiss banks were 
estimated to have $2.3 trillion under management. See David G. Stebing, Insurance 
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Financial fraud prosecutions are complex and frequently expensive, 
with all jurisdictions dedicating substantial resources to combating white 
collar crime. Unlike most other criminal prosecutions, insurance fraud 
prosecutions are increasingly being brought by prosecutors funded 
separately from the state's general revenues. These prosecutors' salaries 
are either entirely or in large part paid by monies obtained by direct 
assessments on the insurance industry. The adoption of this prosecution 
Regulation in Alaska: Healthy Exercise ofa State Prerogative,10 ALASKA L. REV. 279, 281 
(1993) ("Insurance companies and related service industries, including brokers, agents and 
adjusters, employ nearly 2.5 million persons. The insurance industry accounts for nearly 
$100 billion of the gross national product ('GNP') of the United States, with insurance 
premiums alone accounting for more than seven percent of the GNP."). In addition to 
handling large sums of money, the insurance industry is extremely profitable. See Peter G. 
Gosselin, Insurers Saw Record Gains in Year of CatastrophicLoss, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 5, 
2006, at Al ("The companies that provide Americans with their homeowners and auto 
insurance made a record $44.8 billion profit last year even after accounting for the claims of 
policyholders wiped out by Hurricane Katrina and the other big storms of 2005, according to 
the firms' filings with state regulators."). Moreover, insurance is ubiquitous. See Deborah 
A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard:Insuranceas Moral Opportunity, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 26 
(1999) ("The existence of insurance as a fundamental and ubiquitous aspect of both 
commercial and personal life means that an organized system of help is also something 
people take for granted, even if they do not think terribly hard about or even understand the 
way insurance is organized."). 
7 Insurance industry funding for different aspects of an insurance fraud investigation and 
prosecution occurs in a variety of different ways. Many states legislatively mandate an 
assessment on the insurance industry doing business in their states, using a variety of 
different formulae. Likewise, the proceeds of these assessments are distributed amongst 
investigators and prosecutors according to different state-specific systems. For example, 
Pennsylvania assesses insurance companies based on the amount of business they conduct in 
the state, and the proceeds are placed in a fund that is disbursed to prosecutors for use in 
insurance fraud prosecutions. See 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 325.23(c) (2007). The assessed 
funds are kept separate from general revenue and their use is restricted to the Insurance 
Fraud Prevention authority. See id. § 325.23(b). Similarly, in Nevada, insurers are assessed 
in proportion to the premiums they charge in the state to support units established in the 
Office of the Attorney General that investigate and prosecute persons who commit insurance 
fraud. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 679B.700 (2007). The Nevada assessed funds, even if unused 
at the end of the fiscal year, never become part of the state's general funds. See id. In New 
Jersey, the Division of Insurance Fraud is empowered to investigate allegations of insurance 
fraud and refer any possible criminal activity to the Attorney General. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17:33A-1 to A-30 (2007). The cost of the Division is borne by the insurance companies 
themselves based on a proportion of the premiums received by each insurance company in 
the State. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33A-8(g). 
Some states seem primarily interested in regulating automobile insurance fraud. 
California, for example, assesses all automobile insurance companies "doing business in that 
state." See CAL. INS. CODE § 1872.8(a) (2007). Fifty-one percent of those funds are then 
allocated for distribution to district attorneys for investigation and prosecution of automobile 
insurance fraud cases. Id. (stating that California assesses automobile insurers up to $1.00 
per insured vehicle per year). Likewise, Rhode Island has an Office of Automobile Theft 
and Insurance Fraud, which investigates and prosecutes all forms of automobile insurance 
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funding method allows insurance fraud prosecution programs to exhibit the 
most comprehensive presence of any private industry in the enforcement of 
relevant criminal laws.8 
fraud. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-50-1(b) (2007). The Office is funded by the insurance 
companies that do business in the State in the amount of $1.00 per vehicle insured. Id. § 31-
50-4. 
Private, voluntary industry groups also offer financial support as investigators and have 
picked up various prosecutorial costs in specific cases. See discussion of the Informal 
Alliance infra Part III.B. In quite a few states, individual companies are frequently 
legislatively mandated to create and fund internal "special investigation units" to investigate 
possible frauds within their companies. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 409 (McKinney 2008). 
Fraud prevention plans and special investigations units: 
(a) Every insurer writing private or commercial automobile insurance, workers' 
compensation insurance, or individual, group or blanket accident and health insurance 
policies issued or issued for delivery in this state, except for insurers that write less than three 
thousand ofsuch policies, issued or issued for delivery in this state annually, and every entity 
licensed pursuant to article forty-four of the public health law except those entities with an 
enrolled population of less than sixty thousand persons in the aggregate and, except those 
entities licensed pursuant to sections forty-four hundred three-a, forty-four hundred three-c, 
forty-four hundred-d, forty-four hundred three-f and forty-four hundred eight-a of the public 
health law shall, within one hundred twenty days of the effective date of this amended 
section to be promulgated by the superintendent to implement this section, file with the 
superintendent a plan for the detection, investigation and prevention of fraudulent insurance 
activities in this state and those fraudulent insurance activities affecting policies issued or 
issued for delivery in this state. The superintendent may accept programs and processes 
implemented pursuant to section forty-four hundred fourteen of the public health law as 
satisfying the obligations of this section and regulations promulgated thereunder. 
(b)(1) The plan shall provide the time and manner in which such plan shall be implemented, 
including provisions for a full-time special investigations unit and staffing levels within such 
unit. Such unit shall be separate from the underwriting or claims functions of an insurer, and 
shall be responsible for investigating information on or cases of suspected fraudulent activity 
and for effectively implementing fraud prevention and reduction activities pursuant to the 
plan filed with the superintendent. An insurer shall include in such plan staffing levels and 
allocations of resources in such full-time special investigations unit as may be necessary and 
appropriate for the proper implementation of the plan and approval of such plan pursuant to 
subsection (d) of this section. 
(2) In lieu of a special investigations unit, an insurer may contract with a provider ofservices 
related to the investigation of information on or cases of suspected fraudulent activities; 
provided, however, that an insurer which opts for contracting with a separate provider of 
services, shall provide to the superintendent a detailed plan therefor, pursuant to requirements 
set forth in regulation by the superintendent. 
Id. 
8 Private financing of aspects of a criminal prosecution, including assisting with 
investigations, has been subject to both judicial and scholarly criticism. See Joseph E. 
Kennedy, Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions and the Differing Protections of 
Liberty and Equalityin the CriminalJustice System, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 665, 687-707 
(1997). Private financial assistance from insurance companies to assist in effectuating 
insurance fraud prosecutions seems to have occurred initially on a strictly voluntary basis. 
See id. at 668. 
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The enforcement of the criminal laws is a public trust.9 It is generally 
accepted that criminal defendants are entitled to a certain amount of 
neutrality and disinterestedness on the part of the prosecutor, particularly as 
a part of defendant's right to a fair trial.10 The prosecutor's office is seen as 
representing the people, and the office seeks justice within the confines of 
governmental impartiality.11 As such, it is important to examine these new 
institutionalized structures and their entwinement with private interests as 
potential sources of risk to that notion of impartial justice. 
12 
Moreover, the consequences of even a perception of improper 
influence on fraud prosecutions implicate other relevant policy 
considerations. The existence of statutory schemes which offer even the 
reasonable inference of injustice, such as perceptions of conflicts of 
interests, may themselves have undesirable consequences.' 3 Attorneys have 
9 See Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249 (1980) ("Prosecutors... must serve the 
public interest.").
10 For an excellent and comprehensive discussion on the positive and normative concepts 
of prosecutorial neutrality, see Bruce Green & Fred Zacharias, ProsecutorialNeutrality, 
2004 Wis. L. REV.837, 850-52 (2004).
11Frequently, neutrality is seen to require some sense of impartiality and sense that 
justice has been done. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The United 
States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
govern at all."); Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that a 
criminal defendant is entitled "to an impartial prosecutor, who can make an unbiased use of 
all options available"); People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 315 (Cal. 1996) (noting that "the 
nature of the impartiality required of the public prosecutor follows from the prosecutor's role 
as a representative of the People as a body, rather than as individuals"); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008) ("[A] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister ofjustice 
and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to 
see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice."). 
Though the courts appear to recognize impermissible prosecutorial behavior when 
required, they have had trouble articulating a recognizable standard for its breach. See, e.g., 
Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It is a bit easier to say what a 
disinterested prosecutor is not than what he is. He is not disinterested if he has, or is under 
the influence of others who have an axe to grind against the defendant, as distinguished from 
the appropriate interest that members of society have in bringing defendants to justice with 
the respect to the crime with which he is charged.").
12 In terms of Madisonian constitutionalism, all legitimacy of government is dependant 
upon freedom from interested factions. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at n. 161 ("For 
Madisonians, the capture of government power by private interests destroys the legitimacy 
of government power.") (quoting The Federalist No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961)). 
13Trial attorney organizations have recognized the likelihood that the perception of 
improper influence may arise from prosecutions in these industry-funded prosecutor 
situations. See infra Part III.C (discussing ATLA Brief). Moreover, such systems implicate 
society's interest in equality of access to justice. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 707 ("To the 
extent that these additional prosecutions are the product of preferential access to justice for 
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been criminally prosecuted under these systems for actions undertaken 
during civil cases adverse to insurance industry financial interests. 14 Such 
prosecutions, without sufficient prophylactic safeguards, may result in 
chilling the representation available to claimants and implicate issues of 
zealous advocacy. 15 
It is well understood that the threat of criminal prosecution is an 
effective restriction on the bounds of zealousness. As Professor John C. 
Coffee has recognized, between the alternatives of engaged advocacy or 
self-preservation from criminal prosecution, the rational lawyer would not 
likely risk his liberty in favor of his aspirational duty of zealousness.' 6 Fear 
of a non-neutral or otherwise influenced prosecutor implicates issues 
beyond the prosecution of any specific criminal defendant.' 7 Even the mere 
appearance of influence and the concomitant perceived increased risk of 
triggering an unjust prosecution have the capacity to affect the availability 
and efficacy of legitimate advocacy adversely. 18 
monied interests, society's interests in the equal treatment of all victims and of all defendants 
suffer."). 
14 See, e.g., State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1997); see also discussion 
infra Part III.D. 
'5The criminal law plays an important role in the regulation of lawyers, and lawyers are 
not immune from criminal prosecution. See Bruce A. Green, The CriminalProsecution of 
Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 327, 327 (1998) (noting that "[blecause lawyers as a class are 
neither exempt from the reach of the criminal law nor immune from criminal prosecution, 
the criminal law plays a significant role in regulating lawyers"). However, scholars have 
argued that, in prosecutions of lawyers for crimes alleged to have been conducted as part of 
their professional conduct, the courts "should take certain procedural steps to guard against 
possible prosecutorial misuse of the criminal law and against criminalizing socially desirable 
and professionally accepted lawyer conduct." Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Crimes:Beyond 
the Law?, 36 VAL. U. L. REv. 73, 76 (2001). Wolfram concludes that a reasonable manner 
for alleviating some of the conflict of prosecution for professional conduct could be 
accomplished by "placing on the prosecution the burden of proving that the conduct of the 
lawyer-defendant in every such case was insupportable as a proper exercise of the lawyer's 
function." Id. at 76. 
16 See John C. Coffee, Jr., ParadigmsLost: The Blurring ofthe Criminaland Civil Law 
Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1879 (1992) ("[I]f ethical 
standards of bar associations and other private groups were regularly criminalized, it would 
not take long before these groups began to self-insure by adopting less aspirational 
standards."). 
17 An unjust or unsuccessful criminal prosecution can, however, advance a victim's 
interests. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 702-03 ("To the degree that the mere filing of a 
criminal accusation by the government against an innocent party is enough to confer benefits 
on a victim, the victim's interest in seeing the prosecution pressed can directly conflict with 
society's interest in prosecuting only the guilty."). 
18The cost/benefit analysis of criminal prosecution frequently fails to take into account 
the cost of deterring legitimate activities. Professor John C. Coffee explained some elements 
for consideration when making this calculus: 
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Those familiar with the relationship between tort law and insurance19 
have long understood the insurance industry's financial interest in the cost 
of tort recoveries 2° and the relationship of those costs to claimants' legal 
representation. Plaintiffs' lawyer advocacy is strongly correlated with an 
adverse effect on insurance industry financial interests.21 If lawyers are 
deterred from representing clients against the insurance industry, the 
implications for the tort system and clients are extensive. Moreover, as 
some members of the trial bar have recognized, the actual motivation of a 
prosecution is irrelevant to that prosecution's ability to chill advocacy.22 To 
To be sure, some may justify pervasive use of criminal sanction based on simple cost/benefit 
reasoning: the loss to those imprisoned is less than the harm thereby averted through specific and 
general deterrence. Yet this analysis depends on a myopic social cost accounting. Even if the 
deterrent effect gained under such a system of enforcement exceeded the penalties actually 
imposed, additional costs need to be considered, including the fear and anxiety imposed on risk-
averse individuals forced to live under the constant threat of draconian penalties.... Ultimately, 
if we measure the success of the criminal law exclusively in terms of the number of crimes 
prevented, we would wind up, in Herbert Packer's memorable phrase, "creating an environment 
in which all are safe but none are free." 
Coffee, supra note 16, at 1881-82. 
19 Insurance industry groups have succeeded in obtaining legislative action through the 
political process on other financially consequential areas of law reform, such as with their 
success with "tort reform." See Thomas A. Eaton & Susette M. Talarico, Testing Two 
Assumptions About Federalism and Tort Reform, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 371, 397-98 (1996) 
(offering empirical evidence on insurance industry effect on legislation with a finding that, 
for example, "punitive damage-cap legislation is positively associated with insurance 
industry strength and the proportion of lawyers in the legislature, and negatively associated 
with the proportion of Democrats in the legislature [which] suggests that state lawmakers are 
responding more to the political demands of powerful interest groups than to objective 
assessments ofparticular local problems"). 
20 For tort recovery purposes, there are generally two classes of defendants-those with 
insufficient assets or who are otherwise judgment proof as a matter of law, and those who 
are insured. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment ProofSociety, 63 WASH & LEE L. REv. 
603, 613 (2006) ("Americans are the largest consumers of liability insurance... spending 
roughly 2% of GNP."); see also Kent D. Syverud, On the Demandfor Liability Insurance, 
72 TEX. L. REv. 1629, 1640 n.37 (1994) ("Most individual defendants in common types of 
tort litigation-including automobile accident litigation-lack significant collectible assets 
other than their insurance policies."). 
21 See Michael Orey, In Tough Hands at Allstate, Bus. WEEK, May 1, 2006, availableat 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/06_1 8/b3982072.htm. The article 
describes a McKinsey strategic analysis of attorney effect on claims costs designed for 
Allstate: 
One of the key elements of McKinsey's plan was reducing the number of claimants who turn to 
attorneys after an accident for help in collecting their insurance. The consultants even forecast 
what the potential claims in this area would mean for Allstate stock. A 25% drop in attorneys 
appearing in several categories ofcases could add $1.60 to Allstate's share price. 
22 See, e.g., Brief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America Amicus Curiae, 1998 
WL 35018415 at *4-5 [hereinafter ATLA Brief]; see also infra Part III.C (discussing the 
brief). 
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a very great extent, so long as the plaintiffs' bar perceives such prosecution 
as arising from the improper influence of private interests on the actions of 
a prosecutor, fear of biased prosecution could reasonably be predicted to 
restrict and inhibit the trial bar's activities.2 3 In this context it might truly 
be said that even the appearance of impropriety is likely sufficient to inhibit 
advocacy. 
This Article will explore the structure of the insurance industry-
prosecution alliance ("The Alliance") as it is expressed in various states. 
Part II will give careful attention to how these institutionalized 
arrangements increase the risk of improper private influence on public law 
enforcement decision-making. Part III will explore how the Alliance 
system may chill legitimate claims and particularly affect the functioning of 
tort plaintiffs' lawyers in an inappropriate manner. Part IV will explore the 
Alliance in terms of both a prosecutor's ethical duty of independence as 
well as a potential due process threat. The final section of the Article will 
suggest certain prophylactic reforms to attorney prosecutions for 
professional conduct, since it is unlikely that the Alliance will be 
dismantled in the near future. The Article concludes with one such 
suggested procedure. 
II. THE ALLIANCE IN ACTION 
The prosecution of criminal offenses requires substantial public 
funding, and municipalities are often reluctant to provide sufficient tax-
funded revenues.24 Historically, police departments and prosecutorial 
agencies have not received adequate tax funding to combat the volume of 
crime that exists in their areas of jurisdiction. Despite a general 
understanding that insurance fraud is pervasive and costly,26 insurance fraud 
23See ATLA Brief,supra note 22, at *4-5. 
24See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 668 ("Taxes, the traditional means of financing 
government prosecutions, are seen as politically unpopular.").
25See id. ("Prosecutors at all levels of government face budget cutbacks .... Allowing 
some sort of private financial contribution arguably helps to close the gap between supply 
and demand for the prosecution of crime.").
26 Sociological research finds that the public views insurance fraud as rampant and more 
prevalent than insurance company denials of valid claims. See Valerie P. Hans & Juliet Dee, 
Whiplash: Who's to Blame?, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1093, 1097 (2003) ("[Tlhe public 
believe[s] that.., fraud among claimants is rampant. Respondents in one national poll 
estimated which was likely to be more frequent, an insurance company denying a valid claim 
or a person attempting to bring a fraudulent claim. Over half of the poll respondents thought 
that an individual was more likely to bring a fraudulent claim."). 
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cases would likely be an under-prosecuted crime without alternative 
funding programs. 27 
Insurance fraud is inarguably extremely costly. The losses to 
insurance companies from insurance fraud have been estimated at $120 
billion per year.28 The industry estimates that these fraud losses cost the 
average American family $300 annually in higher insurance premiums.29 
Hence, industry financing of insurance fraud bureaus is seen as a mutually 
beneficial investment. For example, the "Mission Statement" of the New 
Mexico Insurance Fraud Bureau remarks on the willingness of the 
insurance industry to fund their program, finding the industry "very willing 
to finance the bureaus, because of the potential return on investment: for 
every dollar an insurance company spends in support of a bureau, it retains 
ten dollars that would otherwise be lost to insurance fraud., 
30 
A. THE ALLIANCE'S FORMS AND FUNDING 
Currently, there are three basic models by which the insurance industry 
and government coordinate and integrate the investigation and prosecution 
of insurance fraud. The first model, unique to Massachusetts, creates a 
27 See Robert W. Emerson, Insurance Claims Fraud Problems and Remedies, 46 U. 
MIAMI L. REv. 907, 910 (1992) (suggesting that in the absence of career prosecutors, most 
simply "lack the experience, knowledge, or interest to prosecute cases of insurance fraud 
aggressively"). 
28 See Carrie Coolidge, DirtyRotten Scoundrels, FORBES, Oct. 16, 2006 ("[The] National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners ...guesses that insurance fraud costs $120 billion 
a year in the U.S."); Peter Hull, Fraud Awareness Week Gets Its Own Expo, POST & 
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Nov. 6, 2006 ("Insurance fraud costs business and consumers 
nearly $120 billion a year, including $85 billion a year for health care fraud and $30 billion a 
year for property and casualty insurance fraud, according to the Insurance Information 
Institute."); Suspected Insurance FraudRingleader Turns HimselfIn, U.S. STATES NEWS, 
Feb. 14, 2007 ("It is estimated that 80 to 120 billion dollars in the United States is lost to 
insurance fraud every year."). 
29 The National Insurance Crime Bureau estimates the average American household pays 
higher insurance rates as a result of company losses from insurance fraud. Insurance Fraud: 
Understanding the Basics, National Insurance Crime Bureau Fact Sheets, 
https://www.nicb.org/cps/rde/xchg/nicb/hs.xsl/83.htm (select "Insurance Fraud") (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2008). Households likely suffer in other ways; empirical evidence suggests the 
insurance industry offers lower initial settlements for claims made in areas where the 
perception of policyholder claims exaggeration is strong. See Keith J. Crocker & Sharon 
Tennyson, InsuranceFraudand Optimal Claims Settlement Strategies, 45 J.L. & ECON. 469 
(2002) (finding "convincing support for the notion that insurers adopt claims payment 
strategies designed to mitigate a claimant's incentives to invest resources in inflating injury 
claims"). 
30 New Mexico Public Regulation Commission, http://www.nmprc.state.nm.us/ 
consumer.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
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quasi-governmental agency,31 a majority of whose directors are appointed 
by insurance industry associations.32 Massachusetts's model is also unique 
in that the two trade industry groups assessed have only a voluntary 
membership which may choose to contribute additional monies beyond the 
minimum legislatively assessed upon them.33 The second model, followed 
by a majority of states, creates a specialized insurance fraud bureau within 
the state's Department of Insurance, the Attorney General's Office, or some 
other governmental agency.34 The final model, which exists in eight states, 
consists of a less formalized interaction of the parties due to the 
nonexistence of a formal insurance fraud bureau. In these jurisdictions, 
insurance companies or trade organizations provide private investigators to 
work in tandem with public officials. 
1. The MassachusettsModel 
The Massachusetts legislature statutorily created an entity called the 
Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts ("IFB").35 The IFB is considered 
31 "Quasi-governmental" is a particularly unclear appellation. Even the United States 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit is somewhat unclear about its status. United States v. 
Pimental, 380 F.3d 575, 594 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The IFB straddles the line between a 
government and a private entity, having attributes of each."). The District Court from which 
that appeal was taken was not as convinced of even the "quasi" public nature of the 
Massachusetts IFB. See United States v. Pimental, 199 F.R.D. 28, 33 (D. Mass. 2001) 
(concluding that "the IFB inhabits a region of the private/public spectrum that is much closer 
to a purely private agency"). The First Circuit, however, seemed to be swayed by its 
determination that IFB funding as more appropriately "akin to a state-mandated tax on 
insurance companies than a voluntary expenditure by private entities." Pimental,380 F.3d at 
593. 
32The mixed nature of the Board of Directors along with the requirement that the IFB 
offer biannual reports sufficient for government oversight is undoubtedly part of the source 
of its "quasi-governmental" status. Review of the First Circuit's description of the agency in 
Pimentalis useful. See Pimental,380 F.3d at 592-94. 
33 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 427, § 13 (1996). The Massachusetts IFB is unique in that it 
only assesses two Massachusetts insurance associations with voluntary membership, the 
Automobile Insurance Bureau and the Workers' Compensation Rating and Inspection 
Bureau. Id. Also unique to the Massachusetts IFB, a minimum contribution of the two 
rating bureaus is mandated by statute, but the rating bureaus may increase their contribution 
at their discretion. Id. Portions of the assessments-and contributions, if any-fund the 
investigatory and prosecutorial actions of the Insurance Fraud Division of the Attorney 
General's Office. Id. 
34 Most states mandate assessments on all insurers doing a certain amount of business in 
the state. See supranote 7. 
35 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 427, § 13 (1996). The IFB website describes the agency as 
follows: 
The Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts is a unique and multifaceted investigative agency 
dedicated to the systematic elimination of fraudulent insurance transactions. Authorized by an 
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by courts to be a "quasi-governmental" agency.36 It employs approximately 
thirty full-time investigators.37 
The IFB is not a pure governmental agency, in the sense that the 
majority of its Board of Directors are not public officials 38 and it is funded 
by a special assessment rather than general revenues. 39 IFB funds derive 
from the assessment on two insurance company trade associations in which 
membership is voluntary. These two associations each provide five of the 
IFB Board's directors, for a total often of the fifteen members of the Board, 
with the remaining five being public officials. The IFB's purpose is to 
investigate allegations of insurance fraud referred to it and, when 
appropriate, refer these allegations to various prosecutorial offices for 
further action. 
The method through which the IFB receives its cases is also 
noteworthy. The vast majority of its cases are acquired by direct referral 
from insurance companies who are statutorily obligated to advise the IFB of 
their suspicions whenever they "have reason to believe" that an insurance 
transaction may be fraudulent.40  Once the IFB receives a referral from 
Act of the Massachusetts Legislature and signed into law in 1990, the Insurance Fraud Bureau 
undertakes cases for investigation and preparation for criminal prosecution. 
The Bureau is wholly funded by the insurance industry in Massachusetts. In addition to 
investigators, the I.F.B. has a research division, a legal division and an administrative division. 
Insurance Fraud Bureau personnel work with insurance companies' claim and investigative 
staffs, local, state and federal police departments and agencies in other states to accomplish our 
mission ofprevention, investigationand prosecution offraudulent insurance activity. 
Overview, Insurance Fraud Bureau, http://www.ifb.org/overview.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 
2008) (emphasis in original). 
36 The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has referred to the IFB as a 
"quasi-governmental" agency with sufficient government interest to allow their access to 
grand jury materials. Pimental,380 F.3d at 596. 
37 See Overview, Insurance Fraud Bureau, http://www.ifb.org/overview.htm (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2008). 
" Pimental, 380 F.3d at 592. The IFB is subject to state oversight. See id. at 593 
("Although only a third of the IFB's board members are public officials, the IFB's purpose, 
organizational scheme, and basic operations are all dictated by statute. And while the IFB's 
day-to-day administration within the framework is, in large part, controlled by individuals 
who are not public officials, it is also subject to the constant oversight of the Massachusetts 
legislature, to which the IFB must submit a report every six months."). 
39 See supranote 32. 
40 
Who Must Refer: Insurance company personnel who have reason to believe that a Massachusetts 
insurance transaction may be fraudulent, or who have knowledge that a fraudulent transaction is 
about to take place, or has taken place in Massachusetts, are required by Massachusetts law to 
report the suspected fraud to the Insurance Fraud Bureau of Massachusetts (IFB). 
The IFB Referral Process and Procedures, May 2004, http://www.ifb.org/REFERRAL% 
20PROCESS/refP/20process%20internet%20updated.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2008) 
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either an insurance company or from a call placed to its public "hotline," it 
proceeds to investigate the cases under its statutory authority. Case files are 
created and reviewed, and when the IFB's executive director "is satisfied 
that a material fraud, deceit, or intentional misrepresentation has been 
committed in an insurance transaction, he must refer the matter to the 
attorney general, the appropriate district attorney or the United States 
attorney."' 1 The Massachusetts IFB is unquestionably busy. In 2005, for 
example, it oversaw 3829 cases of suspected insurance fraud,42 
approximately 85% of which emanated directly from insurance 
companies.43 Of the cases referred, prosecuting authorities subsequently 
were given 146 cases of suspected insurance fraud.44 
In Massachusetts, like other states, the funds acquired by the 
assessment are not limited to the support of the IFB investigative agency; 
the statute additionally authorizes and requires that a certain portion of the 
industry assessment be available to the Massachusetts Attorney General's 
Office.45 According to the implementing legislation, if the Massachusetts 
Attorney General avails himself of these funds, he must use them on 
matters referred to his office by the IFB, and he must designate a total of at 
least thirteen assistant attorneys general to work full-time on these 
matters. 46 Moreover, the IFB has offered various types of "in-kind support" 
to these Fraud Division prosecutors41: 
[W]hile the legislative scheme does not explicitly provide for the transfer of 
resources, monetary or otherwise, between the IFB and the Fraud Division, the IFB 
(emphasis in original); see also 1990 Mass. Acts 380, amended by § 99 of 1991 Mass. Acts 
398, and § 13 of 1996 Mass. Acts 427. 
41Pimental,380 F.3d at 592. 
42 INSURANCE FRAUD BUREAU OF MASSACHUSETTS ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2006), available 
at http://www.ifb.org/2006_IFBAnnualReport.pdf. 
43Id. at 15. This is a significant departure from the IFB's first year of operations. See 
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 678, at *13 (Super. Ct. 1998) ("Over the course of 
its first seven years, the IFB has received approximately 12,863 reports of insurance fraud: 
6,566 of these reports came from insurance companies (51% of the total); 5,337 originated 
from the public (41% of the total)."). 
44 INSURANCE FRAUD BUREAU OF MASSACHUSETTS ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42, at 1. 
45See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 427, § 13 (1996); see also Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr., at *21 
(explaining the process and noting that "[e]nclosed with the letter [from the Massachusetts 
Executive Office of Consumer Affairs and Business Regulation] is an invoice for the 'AGO 
Assessment,' to be remitted to the state Division of Insurance. On a quarterly basis, the AIB 
and WCRIB [the assessed trade organizations] each issue a check, payable to the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The checks are deposited into the Office of the Attorney 
General's subaccount of the General Fund, and are specifically designated for the Fraud 
Division. The Office of the Attorney General subsequently uses those funds to pay the 
salary, fringe benefits and indirect costs of the Fraud Division assistant attorneys general"). 
46 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 427, § 13 (1996). 
47Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr., at *23. 
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has nevertheless provided in-kind support to the Fraud Division by assisting with the 
investigation of cases assigned for prosecution. This assistance has consisted of 
obtaining documents, interviewing witnesses, serving subpoenas, providing charts and 
photographs, and arranging for handwriting and accident reconstruction experts. On 
occasion, IFB investigators have provided airline tickets or other travel 
reimbursement for out-of-state witnesses, and the IFB has given the Fraud Division 
computer software (the "Excel" spreadsheet program) to assist it in tracking cases. As 
specifically relates to this case, the IFB has reimbursed an assistant attorney general 
for his purchase of a "Seagate" hard drive, has provided blank computer back-up tapes 
and an extension cord to assist the Fraud Division in its investigation and search of the 
computer system at the defendant's law firm, and has paid the bill of the computer 
expert who assisted in settin 8up the Ellis & Ellis computer system in preparation for 
the Commonwealth's search. 
Though the IFB may refer their cases to any prosecutor's office, 
including the United States Attorney or local District Attorney, they refer 
the vast majority of their cases to the Attorney General's funded 
prosecutors. In an amicus curiae brief submitted by the American Civil 
Liberties Union critiquing the Massachusetts IFB financial structure, the 
ACLU particularly pointed to the availability of restitution only in cases 
handled by the Attorney General in administrative hearings as an 
"incentive," which could partially explain the higher referral rate to the 
Attorney General's office.49 
In any such novel funding scheme for a prosecutorial office, questions 
of propriety will inevitably arise. Arguably, a minimum annual assessment 
or any legislatively mandated scheme lessens the pressure on investigators 
or prosecutors to become partisans of their funding industry by infusing 
public authority into the funding program.50 Clearly, the interests of an IFB 
office investigator or funded prosecutor are different from those of a purely 
private investigator or purely private prosecutor. However, a conclusion 
that public authorization reduces the amount of private influence in criminal 
prosecution vis-A-vis a purely private investigation or prosecution varies 
significantly from a determination that such system allows for no influence 
or no improper influence. Moreover, to determine the potential for 
prosecutorial bias, an analysis of the influence such funding has on IFB 
investigators, as well as prosecutors, must be included in any legitimate 
inquiry into the risks such system poses to prosecutorial neutrality and, 
importantly, the public perception of that risk.51 
Id. 
49 Brief of Curiae Citizen, Civil UnionAmici Public American Liberties of 
Massachusetts, and Common Cause of Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Ellis, No. SJC-
07846 (Mass. Nov. 9, 1998) [hereinafter ACLU Brief]. 
50 See Kennedy, supra note 8, at n.131. 
51The Massachusetts IFB is not simply some form of complaint screener for the 
Attorney General's Office; rather, the IFB proactively assists in investigating and 
48 
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The Alliance funding system in Massachusetts has undergone one 
significant challenge to date. In Commonwealth v. Ellis,52  the 
Massachusetts system was challenged by attorney-defendants accused of 
insurance fraud. Objecting to the funding relationship between the 
insurance companies, the IFB, and the prosecution, the defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss the insurance fraud indictments, disqualify prosecuting 
counsel, or both.53  In their motion, the defendants contended that the 
assistant attorneys general prosecuting their state criminal cases were 
impermissibly biased due to the novel statutory scheme54 funding the IFB 
and the Insurance Fraud Division." 
After a nonevidentiary hearing, the motion to dismiss was denied by 
the trial court,56 and the denial was later affirmed by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court.5 7 The latter court concluded that the prosecution 
had not deprived the defendants of any constitutional right, although a 
majority of the Court expressed concern that the close relationship between 
the IFB and the Insurance Fraud Division might be "difficult to justify on 
policy grounds. 58 
Subsequently, the attorney-defendants filed a pretrial habeas corpus 
petition in the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 59 The Federal District Court was markedly unsettled by the 
unusual relationship between the state and the insurance companies, as it 
ordered the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to respond to the defendant's 
discovery requests and scheduled an evidentiary hearing to take place one 
60month before the state court trial was scheduled to commence. As a 
result, the Commonwealth filed two successive petitions for extraordinary 
relief with the First Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to reverse the district 
prosecuting cases. For instance, the IFB has provided computers to the Attorney General's 
office to assist in complex investigations and paid travel fees for accident reconstruction and 
medical expert witnesses. Ellis, 8 Mass. Rptr. at *23. 
52 id. 
53id. 
54 Among other unique aspects to the Massachusetts system, the implementing 
legislation allows for the insurance industry associations to voluntarily increase their 
contributions to the system. See supra note 26. 
55Ellis, 8 Mass. Rptr. at *23 
56 id. 
57Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1999). 
58 Id. at 654. 
59In re Justices of the Super. Ct. Dep't of the Mass. Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 
2000). 
60 Id. at 14. In a second order, the district court also denied motions by the IFB and the 
Commonwealth to quash defendant's requests to depose four IFB board members. Id.at 15. 
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court's order and quash depositions of four IFB Board members. 61 The 
Commonwealth maintained that the pretrial habeas proceedings in federal 
court unduly interfered with the ongoing criminal proceeding in the state 
trial court. While the First Circuit abstained in favor of the pending state 
prosecution,62 it took the extraordinary step of issuing a writ of advisory 
mandamus,63 instructing the district court to dismiss the defendant's habeas 
petition without prejudice.64 
Although the First Circuit denied a full discovery process allowing 
clarification of the IFB's relationship to the Massachusetts Attorney 
General's Office, this case reveals how this arrangement will engender 
concern throughout the country. As the First Circuit itself noted, even the 
concept of granting federal habeas relief for a "disinterested prosecutor" 
claim was an issue of first impression.65 Inevitably, as each state expands 
its relationship with private industries as part of their ongoing prosecutorial 
process, these arrangements will come under varying forms of 
constitutional scrutiny. 
2. The MajorityModel 
Most states do not follow the Massachusetts model of having a special 
private or minimally "quasi-public" insurance fraud bureau. Instead, the 
majority of states place their insurance fraud unit within existing 
governmental departments,66 frequently either as a division of the state's 
regulatory Department of Insurance or within the Attorney General's 
Office. 
Currently, there are forty-seven "majority model" fraud bureaus in 
thirty-nine states.67 In these jurisdictions, just as in Massachusetts, the 
61 Id. at 14-15. 
62 Id. at 21. 
63 Id. at 13-15 (discussing the distinction between supervisory and advisory mandamus 
and its appropriateness in this context). The First Circuit sought to express the extraordinary 
nature of its decision from the outset, stating that "we determine that this case poses an issue 
of such importance, and one so elemental to the proper role of the federal judiciary in our 
constitutional scheme, as to warrant the issuance of an advisory mandamus granting the 
requested relief." Id. at 13. 
'4 Id. at 22. 
65 Id.at 16. 
66 Louisiana, for instance, integrated its insurance fraud unit within its state police force. 
Despite its unusual location, the office works much the same as those offices housed within 
Departments of Insurance or as in the Massachusetts model, with 62% of its referrals 
received from insurance carriers. LA. DEP'T OF INS., STATE OF LA., PLAN OF OPERATION FOR 
THE LOUISIANA AUTO THEFT AND INSURANCE FRAUD PREVENTION AUTHORITY (2004), 
available at http://www.ldi.state.la.us/Documents/LegalServices/LATIFPA/Plan of 
Operation for LATIFPA.pdf.
67 See COALITION AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD, supranote 1, at 3, 10. 
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insurance companies refer suspected cases of insurance fraud to state 
insurance fraud bureaus, which in turn investigate the cases and refer a 
percentage to state prosecutorial authorities. Since these fraud bureaus 
typically function under the auspices of some state agency, they are often 
imbued with law enforcement powers and their agents may execute search 
69 warrants 68 and carry weapons. In 2003, over 125,000 cases were referred 
by insurers to these various state bureaus for the investigation of potential 
insurance fraud.7° 
The large number of referrals is not surprising given most states have a 
legislatively mandated referral process. In New York, for example, just as 
in Massachusetts, insurance companies are required by law to submit any 
suspected cases of insurance fraud to the Bureau.71 Moreover, New York 
law requires insurance companies that conduct business in the state to 
maintain Special Investigation Units internally for the purpose of 
investigating suspected fraudulent activity.72 Thus, in 2006, the New York 
Insurance Fraud Bureau received 22,884 reports of suspected insurance 
fraud, of which 22,158 originated from insurance companies. In turn, the 
Bureau referred 274 cases to prosecutors.73 
68See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 678 (Super. Ct. 1998). 
69 The New York bureau, one of the pioneering agencies of its kind, was created when 
the state legislature in 1981 established "a team of investigators" to pursue "cases of 
suspected insurance fraud for criminal prosecutions and civil penalties." See Frank Orlando, 
Welcome to the New York Insurance Fraud Bureau 2, http://www.ins.state.ny.us/ 
acrobat/fdbrch07.pdf [hereinafter Orlando, Welcome] (last visited Apr. 19, 2008). Its staff 
investigators, which are required by statute to be "seasoned professionals with years of 
experience in law enforcement and insurance fraud investigation," are designated as peace 
officers under New York law. Id. at 3. This authority gives them the ability to carry 
firearms and effectuate arrests. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 2.10 (McKinney 2007). 
Interestingly, recent iterations of the IFB have seen these investigators assisting other aspects 
of the New York Department of Insurance in their insurance company regulatory capacity. 
See Orlando, Welcome, supra, at 4 ("For the past several years, members of the Bureau have 
accompanied the Health Bureau in financial evaluations and the Property/Casualty Bureau 
on market conduct examinations. The purpose of this assignment is to evaluate insurer 
compliance with Department regulations and New York Insurance Law."). New York, 
however, appears to be unusual in having its Frauds Bureau assist in its regulatory mission. 
70This is an average of 2500 cases per insurance fraud bureau for 2003. This number is 
an overwhelming increase from even five years prior, when in 1998 Insurance Fraud 
Bureaus around the country received over 92,000 referrals about suspected insurance fraud. 
According to J. Joseph Cohen, director of the Kentucky Insurance Fraud Investigative 
Division and acting chairman of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' 
anti-fraud task force, 75% of these referrals came directly from insurance companies. See 
Amanda Levin, AntifraudActivity Gets Results, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Sept. 13, 1999, at 16. 
71N.Y. INS. LAW § 405 (Consol. 2007). 
72 Id. § 409. 
73 INS. DEP'T, STATE OF N.Y., THE ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE INSURANCE FRAUDS 
A VI VA ABRAMOVSKY [Vol. 98 
In these majority model jurisdictions, funding of these units by 
legislatively mandated assessment is common, with varying percentages of 
the assessed funds allocated to investigators and prosecutors according to 
the relevant state's statutory code. Some states, like New York, do not have 
insurance fraud-specific assessment legislation; rather assessments are a 
source of funding for the entire Department of Insurance, including its 
regulators.74 Other states, like Pennsylvania, have their insurance fraud 
division prosecutors funded entirely by the assessment, with no money 
coming from the general funds.75 
Arguably, any version of the majority model safeguards against 
institutional influence on the criminal justice process to a greater extent 
than the Massachusetts model, if for no other reason than that their Fraud 
Bureau directors are public officials. This is particularly so in jurisdictions 
such as New York which have industry-assessed funds intermingled within 
overall department budgets. It is tempting to read the likelihood of 
perceived influence as a direct correlation to the exclusivity of the funding 
scheme, particularly if our understanding of the public's perception of 
influence is connected to the overt use of private assets on prosecutorial 
decision-making. This understanding, however, may be overly simplistic. 
To the extent influence is the metric for propriety, funding is simply one 
PREVENTION ACT 6 (2006), available at http://www.ins.state.ny.us/acrobat/fd06ar2g.pdf. 
Another fifty-four cases were referred by the Bureau for civil settlement or sent to the 
Department of Insurance's Office of General Counsel for civil proceedings. Id. In a 2006 
report, the New York Insurance Fraud Bureau delineated its relationship with state 
prosecutors as follows: "Under a program initiated in 2003, Frauds Bureau investigators are 
assigned to prosecutors' offices to work side-by-side with their investigative staff. During 
2006 the Bureau had investigators in 11 prosecutors' offices across the State." Id. at 20. In 
addition, the report states that Fraud Bureau agents worked in tandem with the FBI and the 
U.S. Attorney's Office. Id. at 4. In 2001, then-Governor George Pataki appointed the 
Attorney General as Special Prosecutor for Insurance Fraud. Id. 
A similar arrangement exists in Florida, where the Division of Insurance Fraud receives 
over 13,000 case referrals annually, mostly from insurance companies, resulting in 
approximately 800 arrests each year. In Virginia, insurance companies referred 1638 
suspected insurance fraud cases to state authorities in 2005, up from just 200 in 2000. See 
Iris Taylor, FraudCalledthe "DarkSide" ofInsurance, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), 
Mar. 19, 2006, at D1. 
74 Still, even in New York, insurance industry-assessed funds are relevant. New York's 
Department of Insurance is significantly, though not completely, funded by industry 
assessment. For example, New York's assessed funds account for a greater proportion of the 
Department's budget than general tax revenues, and the funding of insurance fraud 
prosecutors is included in the disbursement of assessed funds. Funding of this office is 
provided as a sub-allocation of resources from the general Insurance Department Budget. 
See ALAN HEVESI, N.Y. STATE INS. DEP'T, A REPORT BY THE NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF 
THE STATE COMPTROLLER, 2004-S-73 (Mar. 31, 2004), available at 
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093005/04s73.pdf. 
75 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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avenue of inferring the degree of that influence.76 These systems also create 
formalized relationships between industry and government personnel with 
varying levels of financial independence. These structured relationships 
likewise can be seen as a source of perceived risk on the independence of 
the prosecutor. 
3. The InformalAlliance 
In eight states, including Indiana and Illinois, no dedicated separate 
Insurance Fraud Bureau is present at the state level.77 Nevertheless, the 
Alliance still exists, albeit in a less formal manner. 
Where there are no dedicated insurance crime agencies, industry-wide 
advocacy groups such as the National Insurance Crime Bureau ("NICB") 
often step in to fill the gap by conducting initial investigations, referring 
cases, and offering "expert" assistance to local police and prosecutors.78 In 
cases where an NICB complaint results in prosecution, the investigator can 
often exercise substantial influence on the prosecution of the case.79 Since 
the local district attorney and police are likely to lack specialized 
knowledge of the insurance industry, they may use an NICB liaison to 
supply that expertise. 
B. THE INFERENCE OF INFLUENCE 
1. Inferences ofIndustry Influence in the FormalAlliance 
The creation of a mandated Massachusetts Alliance has influenced 
80 
the character81 and procedure of prosecuting units to a surprising extent. 
76 This conception of analyzing the entire factual background, including, but not limited 
to, monies paid, is echoed by the California courts in their interpretation of the application of 
California's prosecutorial disqualification standard. See Hambarian v. Super. Ct. of Orange 
County, 44 P.3d 102, 107 (Cal. 2002). 
77See COALITION AGAINST INSURANCE FRAUD, supranote 1, at 4. 
78 See Daniels v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65896 (N.D. Ind. 2006). 
79See discussion of Danielsv. Liberty Mutual infraPart II.B.2. 
80 When favoritism can reasonably be construed to have occurred as a result of influence 
on the prosecutor's individual or office's institutional decision-making, the notion of 
equality interests are also implicated. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 674 ("Favoring one 
victim over another as a result of personal influence violates the other victim's equality 
interests."). 
81 Even in the absence of any other consideration or influence, the ability of an industry 
to finance prosecution of crimes affecting its financial interests creates an avenue for 
preferential access to justice. See id. at 706 ("Even if private financing does not diminish the 
access of justice to others, the privately financed victim will enjoy preferential access to 
justice by virtue ofher wealth. A two-tier system of criminal justice would develop in which 
privately financed cases would enjoy the best experts and services while publicly financed 
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For instance, in several federal insurance fraud prosecutions arising from 
Massachusetts IFB investigations, attorneys from the United States 
Attorney's Office shared grand jury transcripts with IFB personnel. 82 A 
review of these cases reflects a changing understanding of the nature of 
these investigators and the application of the grand jury secrecy rule. 3 In 
one early case, where the Government sought a court order prior to 
disclosing the grand jury transcripts, the district court held that IFB 
investigators were private personnel who were not permitted to receive such 
confidential information.84  Another district court reached a similar 
conclusion where prosecutors disclosed grand jury minutes without seeking 
permission and the disclosure was revealed during pretrial discovery. In a 
subsequent decision, the First Circuit held that rather than being a purely 
private agency, the IFB was under sufficient state control to render it a 
hybrid "quasi-governmental" entity.8 6 Consequently, depending on the 
facts of the case and the degree of IFB participation in the investigation, its 
personnel may be sufficiently "governmental" as to permit disclosure of 
confidential grand jury materials.87 As can be seen by this progression of 
cases, at least Massachusetts courts are becoming more comfortable with 
expanding the definition of what had once been presumed to be a private 
investigator88 to constitute a "public" agent permitted access to grand jury 
minutes in certain circumstances.8 9 
cases would be left to compete for their share of limited public funds. A rich victim might 
get a better prosecution than a poor victim. This threat to equality makes no assumption 
about influence or trade-offs between cases."). 
82 See United States v. Pimental, 380 F.3d 575, 596 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v. 
McElroy, 392 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116-17 (D. Mass. 2005); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 158 
F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Mass. 2001). 
83 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). For a excellent examination of this topic, see Mark Kadish, 
Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its 
Process,24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
84 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 118 (holding that the IFB are not 
"government personnel" and denying release of grand jury information to them). 
85 See United States v. Pimental, 199 F.R.D. 28, 34-36 (D. Mass. 2001). 
86 Pimental,380 F.3d at 596-98; see also McElroy, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 116-17 ("It is clear 
that in certain circumstances, an employee or employees of the Massachusetts Insurance 
Fraud Bureau (IFB) can be granted access to grand jury material as 'government personnel' 
as provided in Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(ii), Fed. R. Crim. P., but the grant of access for IFB personnel 
is not automatic."). 
87 See McElroy, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 116-17. 
88 See Pimental, 199 F.R.D. at 33 ("It is quite obvious that the Supreme Judicial Court 
never doubted IFB's status as a private, non-governmental agency in Ellis. A close reading 
of Ellis discloses that the court presumed the private nature of the IFB throughout its 
opinion."). 
89 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 
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Because of the confidential nature of grand jury information and the 
appearance of unfair influence or access, it is troubling that in 
Massachusetts the majority of the IFB Board consists of private appointees. 
Even more troubling, however, is that these Massachusetts prosecutors have 
demonstrably come to view the insurance carriers as sufficiently "client-
like" 90 in their relationship with the prosecutor's office to allow for the 
perception of inappropriate influence. 9' Phrases like "punish ' 92 and 
"target" 93 were used by trial lawyers' associations to reflect their perception 
of the Alliance's capacity to influence prosecutorial charging to the 
lawyers' presumptive detriment.94 
Additionally, trial lawyers clearly perceive the prosecutors as 
inappropriately conflicted. 95 Such perception is fairly justified given that, 
during the Ellis96 litigation, it became apparent that although the privately 
funded insurance fraud unit of the Attorney General's office had a statutory 
mandate to prosecute frauds committed by, as well as against, insurance 
companies, it had never actually done so when the only victim was a 
claimant.97 The Massachusetts Association of Trial Attorneys ("MATA") 
specifically noted that the Fraud Division in fact rejected "insurer fraud" 
cases on the ground of perceived conflicts of interest: 
98 
90 Arrangements such as the Massachusetts model, where prosecutors are funded but are 
not directly retained or employed by the insurance carriers, have not been established as 
creating a true attorney-client relationship. If, however, the Massachusetts prosecutors were 
purely private, their duty of loyalty to their insurance company financier-victims would be 
clear. A private prosecutor represents both the victim who pays for their services and society 
at large. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionalityof Private 
Prosecutors,47 ARK. L. REv. 511, 584 & n.322 (1994). As such, the private prosecutor is 
ethically precluded from acting against that individual's interests or taking an adverse 
position to him in subsequent litigation. See United States v. Young, 481 U.S. 787, 805 
(1987). 
91See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1999); ACLU Brief, supra note 
49, at 21. 
92ATLA Brief, supranote 22, at *4. 
93 Id. at 4-5. 
94 Id. 
95See Brief of Amici Curiae The Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys and The 
Massachusetts Bar Association, Commonwealth v. Ellis, No. SJC-07846 (Mass. December 
2, 1998), 1998 WL 35031552, at *5 [hereinafter MATA Brief] ("The legislation establishes 
in the Attorney General's insurance fraud division an institutional conflict of interest which 
creates-at the very least-the appearance that the financial influence of private parties has 
permeated the law enforcement process.").
96 See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 678, n.39 (Super. Ct. 1998); see also 
ACLU Brief,supra note 49, at 21 
97See ACLU Brief,supra note 49, at 21. 
98 See MATA Brief, supranote 95, at 38 & n.5. 
A VIVA ABRAMOVSKY [Vol. 98 
[Miembers of MATA have presented evidence of fraudulent behavior on behalfof 
insurers to the Fraud Division. These MATA members were told by the Fraud 
Division that they would need to investigate the matter themselves because of a 
"potential conflict" for the Fraud Division to investigate the matter because of its ties 
with the IFB.
99 
In fact, when MATA offered evidence of a pattern of fraud committed 
against policyholders by medical professionals hired by insurance 
companies to conduct examinations of policyholders in relation to their 
claims, one of the prosecutors involved in the Ellis prosecution "declined to 
conduct an investigation on the
00 
grounds that such an investigation would 
present a 'potential conflict."'
' 
The Fraud Division prosecutors' decision to decline to investigate 
allegations of insurer fraud similarly perturbed the Massachusetts ACLU, 
which noted in its amicus brief that 
[a]lthough insurers themselves are listed as potential targets for prosecution, the Fraud 
Division has never prosecuted a single case against an insurer, or an agent of an 
insurer, when the only victim was a claimant. As long as insurers are funding the 
Fraud Division and the IFB, fraud by insurers will remain under, if ever, 
prosecuted.101 
Such actions are certainly suggestive. The fact that a Massachusetts 
Insurance Fraud Division Assistant Attorney General perceived his 
relationship with the insurance industry as sufficiently close to preclude his 
investigation of a fraud case does augment the perception that the 
Massachusetts model creates an untenable conflict of interest situation. For 
this reason, it was not unreasonable for these trial lawyer associations to 
infer that such conflicting interest must also be implicated when a Fraud 
Division prosecutor exercises his discretion in claimant insurance fraud 
prosecutions. In other words, MATA, the ACLU, and the other Ellis amici 
clearly perceive these conflicting interests as so systemic to the institution 
that disqualification is appropriate even in the absence of an actual 
attorney-client relationship with an insurance carrier.10 2 That any 
99Id. (emphasis in original). The grounds for the prosecutor's determination of the 
potential conflict were not given. 
100 Id. at 38. 
101ACLU Brief, supra note 49, at 21. 
102The ethical rules governing prosecutors make it clear that they have a responsibility to 
the defendant. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008) ("[A] prosecutor has the 
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility 
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice."). 
Moreover, prosecuting a case under such a conflict implicates serious due process concerns. 
See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 22 (Va. 1985) ("A conflict of interest on the part 
of the prosecution, in itself, constitutes a denial of defendant's due process rights."). 
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prosecutor would disqualify himself from investigating insurance company 
fraud as a potential conflict of interest supports such an inference. 
An inference of conflicting interests' influence on a prosecutor in the 
charging phase is particularly problematic because this area of prosecutorial 
discretion is beyond the criminal justice system's capacity to meaningfully 
review. 0 3 Therefore, the Massachusetts prosecutor's refusal to investigate 
allegations of insurer fraud due to a potential conflict of interest would be 
particularly troubling to those lawyers most likely to be subjected to IFB 
scrutiny for their own representation of covered claimants. 
104 
In any event, it seems logically inconsistent that circumstances could 
justify failing to bring fraud cases against insurance companies and yet 
allow for the recusal of a prosecutor on conflict-of-interest grounds without 
the obvious perception that some corollary diminution of that office's 
ability to remain properly impartial exists. Though the Massachusetts 
courts were unconvinced of this conclusion, it defies credulity that a public 
prosecutor would identify a potential conflict sufficient to prevent his office 
from investigating allegations of insurer fraud without at least some indicia 
of a potential conflict of loyalty existing for the prosecutor when 
investigating allegations of policyholder insurance fraud. 
Though other legislative funding schemes for insurance fraud cases 
differ among the various states, some analogous inferences could be drawn. 
Fully "governmental" model states like Pennsylvania are funded in a 
manner very similar to Massachusetts's. 0 5 The implementing legislation 
for the Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority is specifically 
designed to keep the assessed monies completely separate from the state's 
103 See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 674 ("The criminal justice system is not structured to 
protect against partiality of the prosecutor to some private interest because the prosecutor's 
decisions about whom to prosecute and to what extent to prosecute are not subject to 
meaningful review."). 
104 The noted lack of disciplinary enforcement of prosecutorial ethics violations may 
contribute to the urgency of this perception See Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional 
Disciplineof Prosecutors,79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001) (reviewing the plethora of applicable 
ethical and regulatory prosecutorial disciplinary rules and determining that they appear 
underutilized); see also Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics 
Codes to Include the Non-AdversarialRoles of FederalProsecutors,37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 
930-34 (1996) (discussing the role of the prosecutor as "an advocate without a singular 
client" and "without a singular purpose"); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek 
Justice"?,26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 626 n.84 (1999) (arguing that a prosecutor's singular 
client is the state, rather than the victims, police, or any other constituency); Fred C. 
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do 
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 57 (1991) [hereinafter Zacharias, Can Prosecutors Do 
Justice?](discussing prosecutors' various constituencies).
105 See 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 325.23 (2007). 
1
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general revenues.10 6 Those monies are held in a restricted trust and are not 
considered "general revenue of the Commonwealth."' 10 7 Use of the funds is 
restricted to "effectuate" only the purposes of the Insurance Fraud 
Prevention Authority's implementing legislation. 0 8 Additionally, in the 
event of IFPA's dissolution, such funds remaining in the trust would be 
returned to the assessed insurance companies, after deducting only the costs 
to the state in closing down the office.'0 9 If funding is pertinent to a 
determination of loyalties, 1 there seems little difference in the 
Pennsylvania funding system (the restricted funds of which may create a 
sense of obligation) and the Massachusetts system. 
2. IndustryInfluence in the InformalAlliance 
Though it is tempting to conclude that the legislative mandate creating 
formal insurance fraud bureaus is itself the sole source of perceptions of 
improper influence on the prosecutorial process, the informal Alliance 
structure suggests otherwise. This is illustrated in Daniels v. Liberty 
Mutual InsuranceCo.,1 11 which involves a district court's determination of 
whether a "NICB" investigator could be considered an "employee of the 
government" for purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act.  2 After having 
been acquitted of criminal charges stemming from alleged insurance fraud, 
Rick Daniels, a Liberty Mutual policyholder, sued his insurance company 
and various allied parties for malicious prosecution. 113 Among the lead 
figures in the underlying prosecution was Joseph Jaskolski, an investigator 
for the NICB.
114 
The NICB and Jaskolski asked the district court to certify that 
Jaskolski was acting as an "employee for the government"' 15 at the time of 
the Danielsprosecution and hence was entitled to immunity pursuant to the 
106 The funds are kept in a special trust fund administered by the State Treasurer. Id. 
§ 325.23(a). All interest earned from the investment or deposit of monies accumulated in the 
fund are deposited in the fund for the same use. Id. 
107 Id. § 325.23(b). 
108Id. 
109Id. § 325.23(g). 
110 See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 320 (Cal. 1996) (recognizing the ability of 
financing to create a sense of institutional obligation to the funding party). 
111Daniels v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:06CV213, 2006 WL 3239994 (N.D. Ind. 
2006). 
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Federal Employee Litigation Reform and Tort Compensation Act.1 16 The 
evidence proffered by Jaskolski and the NICB in support of this motion 
revealed that Jaskolski was the primary moving force behind Daniels's 
investigation and prosecution. 1 7 Not only did he refer the Daniels case to 
the FBI,1 8 but he assisted the FBI agent assigned to the case in conducting 
the investigation 1 9 and had access to grand jury information.1 20  The 
government's identification with Jaskolski was so strong that when Daniels 
sought discovery of grand jury materials, "the Government actually argued 
that Jaskolski was Government personnel," 12' who, as such, "must not 
disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.' 
122 
In his affidavit, Jaskolski further attested that he had accompanied FBI 
Agent Campbell on interviews of witnesses1
23 and on-site inspections,124 
assisted in reviewing documents,1 25 escorted witnesses at the grand jury 
proceeding,1 26 and assisted the United States Attorney at trial.1 27 He further 
' 128 maintained that he acted "under the direct supervision and control" of 
either the FBI or the United States Attorney in conducting these activities, 
and hence "did only what [he] was told to do by either Agent Campbell or 
116 Id. at *1-12. The Federal Employee Litigation Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 
known as the Westfall Act, amended the Federal Tort Claims Act to extend governmental 
immunity from liability to federal employees sued for tortious conduct occurring within the 
scope of their employment. Id. 
117 Id. at *4 (explaining that "[t]he NICB received a request from Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company to investigate a claim made by Liberty Mutual's insureds, the Daniels. 
Jaskolski opened a case file, gathered information for three or four weeks, then contacted the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation ('FBI')"). 
1 Id.at *4. 
19 Id. at *4-5 ("Jaskolski described the relationship as a joint investigation with the 
FBI."). 
120 Id. at *5 (noting the government's relationship with Jaskolski was so close that "the 
United States Attorney's Office treated Jaskolski as if he fell within the provision of Rule 
6(e)(3)(A)(ii) that permits disclosure ofgrand jury matters to government personnel"). 
121 Id. at *16. 
122 Id. at *6 (citing FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)). When Daniels requested that grand jury 
information disclosed to Jaskolski be divulged, Jaskolski opposed the motion, contending 
that he was "government personnel" for the purposes of Rule 6(e). Although the United 
States Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit declined to decide whether he was or was not 
"government personnel" for this purpose, the court held that, even if he was not, the 
government erred in good faith by treating him as such and the information should not be 
divulged. Jaskolski v. Daniels, No. 2:03CV479, 2006 WL 2927593, at *6 & n.2 (N.D. Ind. 
Oct. 12, 2006), aff'd Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2005). 




127 Id. at *9. 
128 Id. at *8. 
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AUSA Butler, or other FBI agents and U.S. Attorneys." 29 Regardless of 
who was nominally controlling whom, however, it is clear that Jaskolski at 
least had an unusually symbiotic relationship with the FBI and the United 
States Attorney. For instance, at Daniels's trial, even though introduced as 
a representative of the NICB, he sat at the prosecution table,130 retrieved 
documents for the government,'3 1 and "considered himself part of the 
prosecution team."'
' 32 
Despite Jaskolski's contentions of FBI and prosecutorial control of his 
actions, the court concluded he was not entitled to governmental immunity 
and allowed the suit for malicious prosecution to go forward. 33 In this 
case, the scope of interaction between the NICB and the prosecution was 
striking, particularly given there was no formal, legislatively mandated 
relationship between the NICB and the United States Attorney's office for 
the Northern District of Indiana. Thus, inferences of influence can be found 
even in the absence of a legislatively mandated scheme and any proper 
conflicts analysis should allow for inquiry and review of non-monetary 
interactions as part of its appraisal. 
III. THE BIG CHILL: How THE ALLIANCE CHILLS THE RIGHTS OF 
POLICYHOLDERS AND INHIBITS THE LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT THEM 
The intertwinement of private interests with public functions, as 
represented by the various forms of the Alliance, requires an examination of 
its consequences for legitimate claimants and access of those claimants to 
legal representation. 
A. A CHILL IS IN THE AIR 
Arguably, success for these fraud bureaus should most correctly be 
measured by their avowed purpose: specific deterrence of fraudulent claims. 
Massachusetts IFB newsletters, however, seem to reflect that little effort is 
being made to gauge whether its initiatives have successfully reduced 
fraudulentclaims, as opposed to having succeeded in generally deterring all 
claims-making. Instead, success appears to be measured solely by the 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at *9.In his affidavit, Jaskolski said that he did not report to anyone at the NICB 
any information regarding the Daniels investigation or prosecution. Id. However, during the 
time of the Daniels case he did concurrently work on other cases "assigned to him by his 
supervisor at the NICB." Id.at *10. 
131 Id. at *9. 
132 Id. 
' Id.at *21. 
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metric of reduced claims dollars generally. 34  For example, the 
Massachusetts IFB published a newsletter entitled focusFraud which 
offered some insights as to its stated and inferred goals. In November 2006, 
the newsletter contained a story headlined Good News! Effects of CIFI 
[Community Insurance Fraud Initiatives] Continue to Impress, which 
stated, 
The 2005 numbers are in-and the formulation of Community Insurance Fraud 
Initiatives (CIFI) in eight Massachusetts urban communities continue to have a 
positive effect on the fight against insurance fraud. For the second year, available 
statistics show a major reduction of total claim dollars and the number of injury 
claims reported since the initiation of the first CIFI program.135 
Nor is the IFB unaware that their presence, along with heightened penalties 
and greater focus on attorneys, is likely responsible for some of this claim 
level. Among reasons cited by the newsletter for this reduction in claims 
activity was newly enacted legislation making insurance fraud chargeable 
as a felony and the passage of an "anti-runner bill" focused on attorney 
conduct in acquiring clients.
1 36 
Prosecutors' statements make it clear that prosecution of attorneys is 
within the specific purview of these attempts to deter fraud through 
prosecution, and the possibility of an overbroad deterrent result is given 
little consideration. For example, highly regarded Philadelphia District 
Attorney Lynne Abraham stated at a symposium that shortly after the 
Pennsylvania Insurance Fraud Prevention Authority was created, she had 
informed the plaintiffs' bar in her jurisdiction 137 that, though her office was 
"not interested in prosecuting attorneys,"1 38 it was interested in "deterring 
attorneys from considering taking any case which has that faint, but 
unmistakable, odor of fraud, which gets stronger and stronger the closer one 
digs.", 39 
Abraham also explained that insurance company referrals to the new 
IFPA could be a benefit to the referring company, as that office represented 
134 See 13 FOCusFRAUD 2, Nov. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.ifb.org/FOCUS% 
20FRAUD/fP/o2OnovO6%20upd.pdf ("The presence of CIFIs [Community Insurance Fraud 
Initiatives] in these major urban areas, combined with other contributing factors, have 
resulted in a decrease in claims of over $192 million over the past two years. These 
communities make up only 8% of the population, but represent 55% of the statewide 
reduction in claims."). 
135 See id.(emphasis added). 
136 Id. 
137 Lynne Abraham, Prosecutionof InsuranceFraudin Philadelphia-ANew Paradigm, 
41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 501 (1997). 
138 Id. at 505. 
139 Id. 
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"the best opportunity for a company to make a financial recovery."' 4 ° She 
pointed out that her office "use[s] not only our own criminal capacities, 
which are unavailable to insurance companies-for example, court ordered 
wiretap and electronic surveillance,"' 14' but also the "the possibility of asset 
forfeiture, civil in rem and criminal in personam proceedings.' 42 
District Attorney Abraham's sentiments, while legitimate, are 
somewhat problematic in their unmistakable implications for the trial bar. 
While attorneys are by no means immune from criminal prosecution, nor 
should they be, the tone of this speech offered implications beyond a 
reminder that lawyers are also subject to the law. A case that has the 
"unmistakable odor of fraud" to an insurance investigator or prosecutor 
might in fact be perfectly legitimate. By informing plaintiffs' attorneys that 
they should avoid "considering" cases that bear even a "faint" odor of fraud 
or even, for that matter, seek to deter lawyers from considering taking a 
case with a strong odor of fraud, there is the clear implication that their 
judgments as to the credibility of their client's claim must be made in 
consideration of heightened personal criminal consequence. Though such 
prosecutorial consequence always existed if a lawyer were to engage in 
criminal conduct, what warrants concern is the fact that such statements 
could easily be construed as prosecutorial comfort with over-deterrence. 
43 
Though an attorney's innocence might well be determined by the end of 
investigation or trial, in the absence of other safeguards, a reasonable 
attorney could well be inhibited from taking cases which would fall within 
the purview of the IFPA office as a sheer exercise in personal prudence. 
When such decision is weighed alongside cases like Ellis or the infamous 
Marks case, discussed infra, such prudence, though detrimental to client 
access to representation, appears quite justified. 
140 Id. at 503. 
141Id. at 504. 
142 Id. 
143 It is important to remember that the prosecutor's power is immense. Justice Jackson, 
perhaps the most famous prosecutor at Nuremberg, explained as follows: 
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in 
America. His discretion is tremendous. He can have citizens investigated ....[H]e can order 
arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on the basis of his one sided 
representation of the facts, can cause citizens to be indicted and held for trial .... While the 
prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in society, when he acts from malice or 
other base motives, he is one of the worst. 
Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, in ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS INPROSECUTION 4 
(John J.Douglass ed., 1977). 
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B. CHILLED POLICYHOLDERS 
Upon review of the criteria which the insurance industry uses to 
identify potentially fraudulent claims, it becomes apparent that many non-
fraudulent claimants would be disinclined to seek indemnity for fear of 
triggering a criminal investigation. In effect, a sufficiently expansive 
standard for identifying fraudulent claims creates a chilling effect on 
claims-making. 
"The concept of a 'chilling effect' . . . describes the situation where 
persons whose expression is protected are deterred from exercising their 
rights by the existence of an overly broad statute."' 144  Although the 
"chilling effect" doctrine is most often applied in the context of free speech, 
there is a recognized equal danger that a "perceived alliance between 
business and the district attorney's office" could chill other legitimate 
rights, such as the making of insurance claims. 145 Scholars have noted that 
even the perception of an alliance may result in not only fraudulent claims 
being deterred, but in deterrence of legitimate claims as well. 
146 
Additionally, if such perception results in chilling the making of legitimate 
claims, the funding industry "derives an additional benefit from not having 
to pay these claims."' 147  Such benefit is specific to the allied private 
industry and does not necessarily comport with society's interest in 
punishing only the guilty. 
The potential scope of this chilling effect is illustrated by the NICB's 
list of indicators to be used by investigators in determining whether a claim 
might "involv[e] medical fraud claim inflation."' 48 Among the pertinent 
items on this twelve-factor list are: 
1. Three or more occupants in the claimant's vehicle; all of whom report similar 
injuries. 
2. All injuries are subjectively diagnosed, such as headaches, muscle spasms, traumas 
and inability to sleep. 
4. All of the claimants submit medical bills from the same doctor or medical facility. 
144 Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06CV0997BBM, 2006 WL 1341302, at *55 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 
2006). 
145 See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 703. 
146 id. 
147 Id. 
148 See Louis J. Papa & Anthony Basile, No-Fault Insurance Fraud: An Overview, 17 
TOuRO L. REV. 611,622 (2001). 
A VIVA ABRAMO VSKY [Vol. 98 
7. Vehicle driven by claimant is an old clunker with minimal coverage. 
9. Claimants retain legal representation immediately after the accident is reported. 
149 
These factors encompass a plethora of legitimate claims. Consider, for 
instance, a working-class family of five involved in an accident while on an 
outing in the old family station wagon. After the accident, the five victims 
go to their family doctor and are diagnosed with soft tissue injuries. 
Believing they need legal representation in order to navigate the insurance 
claims process, the mother asks her union to recommend an attorney. 
These are perfectly innocuous facts, yet an investigator using the NICB's 
criteria would find no fewer than five indicators of insurance fraud and 
would likely pursue the case as a potentially fraudulent claim.150  This 
decision may lead to the hypothetical family experiencing great difficulty in 
getting their medical bills paid. 15' Given the existence of the Alliance, the 
potential risk to them is much greater, since the insurance companies' 
141 Id. at 622-23. 
150 Likewise, the prosecution is aware of the import of the evidence collected by their 
investigators, both to the prosecution and the defense. In a Massachusetts IFB focusFraud 
newsletter, Glenn Cunha, Chief of the Insurance and Unemployment Fraud Division of the 
Office of the Attorney General, wrote a message to IFB investigators reminding them that 
"[t]he investigation portion of insurance fraud cases is just one step in the criminal 
prosecution." Ins. Fraud Bureau of Mass., Messagefrom Glen Cunha, 12 FocusFRAUD 1, 
May 2005, availableat http://www.ifb.org/FOCUS%20FRAUD/ffmay05.pdf. In answer to 
his rhetorical question, "How can we fight fraud and develop more viable cases using the 
resources already at our disposal?", he answered, "The best way is to start thinking of the 
criminal prosecution from the onset." Id. at 2. Other advice for investigators includes the 
reminder that "[d]ocumentary evidence can be a powerful tool in criminal cases. But keep in 
mind that documents can also be used by the defense. The target and his attorney will see all 
the documents that an investigator collects, including internal memos." Id. (emphasis 
added). He concluded with the caution that "[flor evidence to assist in the prosecution of a 
case it must tell a story that is consistent with the theory of the case. Photographs need to 
show damage or lack thereof.... All of this evidence is a tool that will provide the 
foundation for a criminal prosecution." Id. 
151 Sociological research suggests that the common perception of civil juries' sympathy 
to injured plaintiffs is incorrect, especially in the personal injury scenario. See Hans & Dee, 
supranote 26, at 1097. Particularly regarding soft-tissue claims, the researchers found jurors 
likely to question the credibility of the claimant, with significant results to the amount 
awarded. See id. at 1099 ("A scenario experiment in a national poll conducted by Hans and 
Nicole Vadino varied according to whether a hypothetical plaintiff in an accident 
experienced a broken bone or a connective tissue injury, both of which a doctor confirmed. 
Respondents were significantly more likely to believe plaintiff claims of the broken bone. 
They saw the broken bone as more serious than the connective tissue injury, even though the 
consequences of the injury were held constant."). 
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5 2 already-deep suspicion of soft tissue injuries 1 may now result in criminal 
investigation. 53 Awareness of these criteria, or even awareness of frequent 
insurance fraud prosecutions, forces the family to include the potential for 
criminal investigation alongside the denial of claim benefits when 
determining whether to go forward on a contested claim. Under such 
circumstances, they might well decide not to file a claim at all, thus 
relieving the insurance company of its promise to pay made in exchange for 
collected premiums. In the wake of a highly publicized Long Island 
indictment, Professor Evan Schwartz described the potential effect as 
follows: "There will be good people swept up in these indictments and it 
will have a seriously chilling effect on the number of no-fault claims, which 
improves the bottom line of these companies, and a lot of people who need 
[medical] treatment, won't get it.' 
154 
Moreover, the fact that the NICB's list of fraud indicators includes 
early retention of legal representation is particularly ominous. If early 
retention of an attorney is viewed as a manifestation of fraud, then 
policyholders will not only be deterred from filing claims but also from 
obtaining counsel to represent them on the claims they do file. This 
secondary deterrent has the potential to greatly advantage insurance 
companies in the claims adjustment process. 
In cases where claimants fail to retain counsel, insurance adjusters are 
able to settle claims for a fraction of their true value. 55 Claimants are often 
unaware of the full extent of the benefits contained in their policies, and 
may not be able to marshal their medical records and make an adequate 
presentation of their prognosis and future treatment needs. In contrast, an 
experienced plaintiffs' attorney has both the skills and resources to assess 
the full extent of the claimant's loss and negotiate a larger settlement. 
156 
Hence, if insurance carriers can discourage injured policyholders from 
152See Drew Griffin & Kathleen Johnston, Auto InsurersPlay Hardballin Minor-Crash 
Claims, CNN.COM (Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/02/09/insurance.hardball/ 
index.html. 
153The fact that a claim is denied by an insurance company does not mean that the claim 
was meritless, let alone fraudulent. A recent report profiled by the New York Post revealed 
that health insurance companies wrongly denied coverage to ill patients in half the cases 
reviewed by an outside panel of doctors. See Susan Edelman, InsurerDoom Machine, N.Y. 
POST, July 8, 2007, at 6, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/07082007/news/ 
regionalnews/insurer doom_machine-regionalnews susanedelman.htm?page=0. 
154 Robin Topping, DA Finds Lawyers In Middle of Scam, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 20, 
2003, at A20. 
155See discussion ofattorney representation infra Part III.B. 
156Id. 
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retaining counsel, they stand to significantly benefit in terms of reduced
157 
claim settlements. 
There have already been documented instances of insurance companies 
using ethically dubious tactics to prevent claimants from retaining 
attorneys. In 1994, for example, Allstate began distributing a controversial 
flyer entitled Do I Need an Attorney? to policyholders who filed accident 
reports. 158 The flyer suggested financial benefits to those who did not retain 
counsel. 159 The campaign succeeded in reducing the number of claimants 
who hired attorneys by more than 10%160 before being halted by regulators 
in several states.' 6' Since then, according to documents produced in 
connection with a bad-faith action, Allstate has made a deliberate internal 
switch from a "good hands" to "boxing gloves" policy when handling 
represented claims. According to a report by CNN, a company insider 
stated that management consultant company McKinsey suggested Allstate 
put on "boxing gloves" when handling represented claims and engage in a 
"three-D" strategy: deny the claim, delay the settlement, and defend in 
court. 162  According to Business Week, the consultants even included a 
157 Id. 
158 See Unauthorized Practice of Law Complaint v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 001-97 (W. Va. 
State Bar Comm. on Unlawful Practice Sept. 22, 1997), available at 
http://www.wvbar.org/barinfo/announce/Haden.pdf. The West Virginia State Bar 
Committee on Unlawful Practice concluded: 
In reality, the Allstate document, when read as a whole, is clearly and unequivocally an attempt 
by Allstate to convince individuals to not hire an attorney but, instead, deal directly with Allstate. 
The document is further an attempt by Allstate to convince individuals who have been injured by 
an Allstate insured that they will be able to obtain larger and faster settlements if they do not 
retain counsel. 
Id. at 7. 
159See Opinion Letter of Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal, Sept. 28, 
1998, available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=1770&Q=281700 ("We believe 
that an objectively reasonable person would conclude that the flyer, read as a whole, 'advises 
against the need for or discourages the retention of' an attorney. In fact, an objectively 
reasonable person could conclude that the avoidance of attorneys was the flyer's sole 
intent.") (emphasis added); see also Angela Wissman, Before You Decide to See an 
Attorney... ,ILL. LEGAL TIMES, June 1999, at 1("Since at least 1994 Allstate Insurance Co. 
has carried out a nationwide strategy to keep people injured by their insureds away from 
attorneys, say plaintiffs' attorneys and consumer advocates. The strategy included 
contacting claimants soon after the accident, sending them written documents with Allstate's 
pledge to treat them like a 'customer' and providing information about the costs of hiring an 
attorney."). 
160See Brigid McMenamin, A Holy War, FORBES, June 16, 1997, at 48. 
161 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. West Virginia State Bar, 233 F.3d 813, 815 (4th Cir. 2000) 
("On September 22, 1997, the full [state bar] committee issued its written opinion and 
decision that Allstate's dissemination of the pamphlet constituted the unauthorized practice 
of law."). 
162 See Griffin & Johnston, supranote 152. 
2008] AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE 
forecast on the amount of stock price appreciation available from reduced 
attorney representation, predicting that a 25% reduction in attorney-
represented claims in certain categories could add $1.60 to each share of 
Allstate stock.1 63 Given such documented1 64 hostility to policyholders who 
are represented by counsel, and given the NICB's inclusion of claimants 
who "retain legal representation immediately" on its list of suspect 
indicators of fraud, it is entirely plausible that unethical carriers who have 
an effective alliance with prosecutors would single out counseled claims for 
aggressive investigation and referral for prosecution. Even more 
importantly, it is entirely plausible for the plaintiffs' bar to perceive that 
being the case and subsequently restrict their choice of clients to avoid such 
a risk. 
C. CHILLING THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR 
Hence, in cases where policyholders retain counsel, another and 
possibly even greater potential chilling effect exists. Personal injury 
attorneys may become unwilling to take cases. This chilling effect on 
attorneys, just as with claimants, is twofold. In addition to the potential 
reluctance to accept cases, lawyers may experience inhibition in 
negotiating, advocating, and settling on behalf of their clients. 
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA"), in its amicus 
curiae brief in Ellis,165 argues that trial lawyers could perceive criminal 
prosecutions brought under an Alliance system as a method of intimidation: 
The ability to influence the investigation and prosecution of individuals raises the 
potential abuse of [the] power to "punish" an attorney who has been particularly 
successful against an insurer or to exert pressure on an attorney or client to withdraw 
or reduce a liability claim. Similarly, the6otential exists for targeting individuals who 
oppose the insurers' legislative position. 
As the ATLA amici noted, the actual intent of the prosecution in such 
system is nearly secondary in importance to a perceptionof persecution and 
manipulation. According to ATLA, the public will feel that the lawyers 
were targeted for opposing industry interests: 
Regardless of whether a particular investigation or prosecution is actually motivated 
by such considerations, when an attorney who has opposed an insurer is targeted,the 
163See Orey, supranote 21. 
164 The relative frequency of news stories trumpeting insurance company antipathy to 
represented claimants leads credence to the proposition that average policyholders are aware 
of the risks retaining counsel might pose to an expeditious resolution of their insurance 
claims. However, the pervasiveness of this understanding would best be served by empirical 
research currently unavailable. 
165Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1999). 
166ATLA Brief,supranote 22, at *4. 
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public perception that167the criminal justice system is being manipulated by private 
interests is inevitable. 
Moreover, in such a system, it is extremely difficult for outside 
observers to differentiate between a prosecution brought in good faith in 
order to punish insurance fraud and a prosecution brought in bad faith to 
punish zealous advocacy. 
168 
The potential of becoming the target of a criminal prosecution will 
undoubtedly affect an attorney's actions in a variety of different ways. 
When the prosecution commences a grand jury investigation, they often 
subpoena a law firm's or single practitioner's records of clients suspected of 
participating in fraudulent behavior. Knowing that the standard for 
obtaining a subpoena is low, 16 9 a lawyer may restrict his interaction with his 
client so as to maintain case files for his own future defense.170 Most likely, 
lawyers would simply restrict the scope of actions likely to trigger 
insurance company scrutiny, so as to avoid coming to their attention at all. 
D. STATE V.MARK MARKS, P.A.: THE PROSECUTION OF LITIGATION 
TACTICS AS FRAUD 
To understand the full effect even an initial investigation of insurance 
fraud can have on a law firm, it is necessary to understand how such cases 
typically work in practice. A particularly stark example of the implications 
inherent to attorney prosecution is the Florida case of State v. Mark Marks, 
P.A. 17 ' The gravamen of the prosecution in Marks was the insurance 
industry's dissatisfaction with plaintiffs' attorneys who, in their view, 
withheld unfavorable medical information during pre-settlement 
negotiations. The prosecution regarded anything short of absolute candor 
167 Id. at 4-5 (emphasis added). 
168 The majority of prosecutorial decision-making is discretionary and beyond the scope 
of review by either courts or the public. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 703. 
169 Hirschfeld v. City ofNew York, 253 A.D. 2d 53, 58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) ("When the 
district attorney, on his own initiative, issues and serves ... a subpoena in good faith, a 
proceeding is instituted in the grand jury, just as, in an analogous situation, a civil action is 
commenced by the service of a summons. There is no requirement that the people open a 
grand jury proceeding, prior to the return date of a grand jury subpoena, or that the 
subpoena's validity depends on the existence of a particular grand jury at any specific time. 
What is required is that the grand jury be convened... on the return date of the subpoena so 
that the witness has access, if he chooses, to prompt judicial resolution of any challenge to 
the scope or propriety of his examination.") (citations omitted). 
170 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2008) ("A lawyer shall not counsel a 
client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, 
but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposedcourse of conduct with a 
client andmay counselor assista client to make a goodfaith effort to determine the validity, 
scope, meaning or applicationofthe law.") (emphasis added). 
171 State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1997). 
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on the part of plaintiffs' attorneys as tantamount to fraud, 172 regardless of 
the existence of governing rules of civil discovery.' 
73 
On March 10, 1989, led by Florida Insurance Commissioner Tom 
Gallagher, 174 investigators from the Florida Insurance Department staged a 
dramatic, high-profile raid on the North Miami and other offices of Mark 
Marks, P.A. 175  The raid culminated in the seizure of 253 client files 
176 
including "correspondence, doctors' reports, medical bills and financial 
records."' 177  The state bar association then petitioned for an immediate 
172 See Cross-Reply Brief of Marvin Marks at 1, State v. Mark Marks, P.A., No. 85,920, 
1995 WL 17016002 (Fla. Nov. 17, 1995). The brief gives a synopsis of the trial transcripts 
as follows: 
The Court: Well, do you think that they have to hand in a report that says someone is only two 
percent disabled when five reports say he is45 percent disabled? 
[The Prosecutor]: Absolutely. If it's not privileged and it's relevant and material to the claim. 
The Court: What if it's one of four doctors' reports where one finds a two percent and the others 
45? 
[The Prosecutor]: If those are treating physicians where there is no question about privilege I 
think that it's incomplete and fraudulent to exclude those. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
173The Florida Appellate District Court did recognize that the rules of civil discovery 
might be relevant to the determination of the nature of the "incomplete" claim subject to 
fraud prosecution by statute: 
Attorneys are guided by numerous different rules, laws, and cases dealing with the atypical 
obligations of an attorney in an advocate role. Attorneys and their clients enjoy a confidential 
relationship, which includes constraints upon information that can be disclosed to others. Once a 
suit is initiated, rules of discovery provide for an exchange of information between adversaries. 
Even then, some items do not have to be disclosed to an adversary absent special findings by a 
trial court. Specifically, the identities and/or opinions of a non-witness work product expert are 
not discoverable absent a showing of exceptional circumstances under rule 1.280(b)(4)(B). 
Medical reports based on an examination requested by a party do not need to be delivered absent 
a request for such. In personal injury protection claims, a party must turn over all medical 
records concerning a specific condition only after requesting and receiving a copy of medical 
reports from a medical examination requested by the insurer. Finally, the confidentiality of 
medical records is statutorily protected from disclosure in most circumstances until a proper 
subpoena has been issued. 
Marks, 654 So. 2d at 1187 (internal citations omitted). 
174Mr. Gallagher was a candidate for Governor at the time of the raid and gave a press 
conference concerning this case in front of the Marks law office. See Answer Brief of 
Respondent at 8, State v. Mark Marks, P.A., No. 85,920, 1995 WL 17016464 (Fla. Sept. 19, 
1995). 
175See Joe Starita & Fred Grimm, Law Firm'sRecords Seized, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 11, 
1989, at 1-1. 
176See Marks, 698 So. 2d at 535. 
177Id.; Starita & Grimm, supra note 175. 
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suspension of the Marks firm attorneys from the practice of law.178 By 
March 14, the Florida Supreme Court had suspended the firm's principal 
attorneys Marvin Mark Marks and his son Gary from the practice of law. 1
79 
Within months, the state attorney general's office sought to confiscate and 
shutter the firm's law office under the forfeiture provisions of Florida's 
version of the Racketeer-Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act 
("RICO"). 180 
On December 22, the attorney general's office and the insurance 
department jointly announced a thirty-two-count indictment 81 against the 
Marks firm, three of its attorneys, and two doctors who often performed 
medical examinations of the firm's clients. 182 The charges included state 
criminal RICO violations, insurance fraud, grand larceny, and perjury. If 
convicted, Marvin Marks, age fifty-four, faced up to one hundred years in 
jail for the twenty-six criminal counts lodged against him. 83  Press 
coverage touted the raid as the culmination "of the most extensive criminal 
investigations ever [conducted] by the Florida Department of Insurance."'
' 84 
The state insurance commissioner accused the defendants of perpetrating an 
"outrageous ... criminal conspiracy in which attorneys.., set up an 
operation designed to cheat insurance companies out of millions of 
' 185 
dollars." 
The indictment against Marks and his firm focused on the tactics used 
during pre-settlement negotiations. In particular, the firm was accused of 
concealing unfavorable medical reports in an attempt to achieve enhanced 
settlement of no-fault insurance claims. The prosecution contended 186 that 
178 See Joe Starita, Court Suspends Mark Marks Law Practice,MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 14, 
1989, at 1-1. 
179 Id. 
180 See Joe Starita, State Seeks Seizure of Lawyer's Office, Using Rackets Law, MIAMI 
HERALD, Sept. 13, 1989, at 1-1. 
18 See Gallagher Announces Arrests Today in Mark Marks Fraud Operation, PR 
NEWSWiRE, Dec. 22, 1989 [hereinafter Gallagher]; see also David Conn, Fla. Doctor-
Lawyer Ring Indictedfor Theft, Fraud,J. OF COMMERCE, Dec. 26, 1989, at 9A. 
182Gallagher,supra note 181; see also State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 535 
(Fla. 1997). 
183 See Conn, supra note 181, at 9A. 
184 Gallagher,supra note 181. 
185 Id. 
186See Marks, 698 So. 2d at 535: 
In summary, the information charged the eight defendants with engaging in various illegal 
activities including but not limited to: 
Preparation and submission of false and fraudulent medical tests and procedures for the 
purpose of enhancing the settlement value of insurance claims; 
Soliciting clients to undergo unnecessary and dangerous medical tests and procedures for the 
purpose of enhancing the settlement value of insurance claims; 
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submissions to the insurance carriers that did not include all available 
medical information constituted an "incomplete" claim, which, when 
coupled with an intent to defraud, was an impermissible fraudulent 
concealment, the making of which violated recently enacted Section 
817.234 ofthe Florida General Statutes on insurance fraud.
1 87 
The attorney general's office likely viewed the Marks prosecution as a 
test case of the insurance fraud statute, which had only recently been 
enacted. The broadly worded statute not only contained a vague provision 
criminalizing deceptive "incomplete" claims, 88 but also included a section 
that specifically penalized attorneys. 189 In particular, the statute provided 
that "any attorney who knowingly and willfully assists, conspires with, or 
urges any claimant to fraudulently violate any of the provisions of this 
section... or any person who, due to such assistance, conspiracy, or urging 
on such attorney's part, knowingly and willfully benefits from the proceeds 
derived from the use of such fraud, commits insurance fraud."' 9° Notably, 
no similar legislation was enacted to punish fraud by insurance carriers or 
their employees.' 9' 
Altering, forging and concealing medical reports, medical test results and medical bills to 
enhance the settlement value of insurance claims; 
Subornation of false, fraudulent and perjured testimony by clients and other witnesses 
regarding material matters in order to enhance the settlement value of insurance claims; and 
Theft of monies from various insurance companies by means ofthe foregoing acts. 
Many of the charges were based on actions undertaken by the lawyers in the course of their 
representation. See id. ("A large number of the counts in both informations were based on 
the attorneys' actions in representing various clients in insurance claims during pre-suit 
settlement negotiations."). 
187Id. at 535-36; see also State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 654 So. 2d 1184, 1189 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1995) ("As far as can be ascertained, the state can not specifically identify when an 
omission of information by an attorney in an adversarial context is fraudulent, other than to 
say that an omission is fraudulent when there is an intent to defraud."). 
188FLA. STAT. § 817.234(1) (1987) provided in pertinent parts: 
[Any person who,] with the intent to injure, defraud or deceive any insurer: ...(2)Prepares or 
makes any written or oral statement that is intended to be presented to any insurance company in 
connection with, or in support of, any claim for payment or other benefit pursuant to an 
insurance policy... knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading 
information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim... is guilty of a felony in the 
third degree. 
(emphasis added). 
189See FLA. STAT. § 817.234(3)(3). 
190FLA. STAT. § 817.234(3)(4). The statute also references fraudulent violations of Part 
XI of Chapter 627 of the Florida statutes as inclusive to a violation of Fla. Stat. § 817.234 
(3). 
191In response to Marks's equal protection argument addressing the absence of insurance 
companies from the insurance fraud statute, the prosecution in part argued that civil and 
regulatory remedies were sufficient with regards to the insurance companies. 
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During the early stages of the case, the prosecution contended that 
attorneys had both an ethical and legal duty of absolute candor in 
conducting settlement negotiations. Part of this obligation included an 
affirmative duty to disclose all information "arguably material" to the 
insurance claim in the lawyer's pre-suit "offer to settle" letter, 92 or the letter 
was to be considered fraudulently incomplete. 93  The prosecution 
maintained that this was the standard even in a situation where four doctors 
had certified the client as 45% disabled and only one doctor had found her 
disability to be minor.' 94  In essence, the prosecution contended that 
attorneys conducting pre-lawsuit' 95 settlement negotiations with insurers 
were required, on pain of prosecution, to provide the carriers with the 
equivalent of full civil discovery'96 and to undermine their own clients' 
claims, despite the adversarial nature of the proceeding. 
It is interesting to note, however, that neither the prosecution nor the 
insurance department regarded this duty to disclose as reciprocal. During 
discovery, it was revealed that in one of the underlying cases, the insurance 
[C]laimants and insurance companies occupy substantially different legal provisions. Insurance 
companies are heavily regulated by the State. Unfair trade practices and unfair settlement 
practices are prohibited. Fraudulent acts by insurers could result in the loss of licenses to 
conduct business in the State. If insurers fail to settle a legitimate claim, they can be held liable 
for excess verdicts for bad faith. 
Reply Brief of Petitioner at 14, State v. Mark Marks, P.A., No. 85,920, 1995 WL 17016004 
(Fla. Oct. 16, 1995). They even contended that "claimants and their attorneys are not subject 
to these regulations." Id. The fact that lawyers are a similarly regulated group subject to 
similar and extensive civil and regulatory sanctions for fraudulent conduct was not 
discussed. 
192The lower court found that the fraud statute created no such affirmative duty of 
disclosure. See Marks, 654 So. 2d at 1184. 
193 Answer Brief of Respondent, supranote 174, at 8. 
194 id. 
195 Defendant Marks in his answer stated that after initiation of suit, in response to 
subpoena, the reports underlying the alleged fraudulent omission were disclosed. Amended 
Answer Brief of Mark Marks at 5, No. 85,920, 1995 WL 17016463 (Fla. Sept. 25, 1995) 
("When the rules of discovery became operable, all reports were provided.").
196 The Supreme Court of Florida in its review of the statute for vagueness recognized 
that many of the rules of disclosure are governed by existing rules of civil procedure. See 
State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1997) ("Once a suit is initiated, rules of 
discovery provide for an exchange of information between adversaries. Even then, some 
items do not have to be disclosed to an adversary absent special finding by a trial court. 
Specifically, the identities and/or opinions of a non-witness work product expert are not 
discoverable absent a showing of exceptional circumstances .... In personal injury 
protection claims, a party must turn over all medical records concerning a specific condition 
only after requesting and receiving a copy of medical reports from a medical examination 
requested by the insurer .... [T]he confidentiality of medical records is statutorily protected 
from disclosure in most circumstances until a proper subpoena has been issued.") (internal 
citations omitted). 
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company had concealed a report prepared by its adjuster suggesting that the 
gas station owner who had allegedly caused the injury was negligent.' 97 
When this was brought to the attention of the prosecutor, he declined to file 
charges against the carrier or its employees. 
198 
The trial court dismissed many of the insurance fraud charges on the 
theory that the statute was unconstitutionally vague as to what would 
constitute fraudulently "incomplete" insurance claims, given the nature of 
the attorney-client relationship. 99 The Florida Supreme Court upheld the 
dismissal of these charges in part because they recognized that an attorney 
has a special role in society, that of an advocate. They explained that 
it is an attorney's unique obligations [sic] when viewed in conjunction with the term 
"incomplete" that renders this particular statute vague as applied to attorneys 
[b]ecause attorneys, pursuant to statute, case law, procedural rules, and rules of 
professional regulation, are customarily required to withhold certain types of 
information throughout the representation.2 00 
The Court recognized that the "unique obligation" of the lawyer and 
the nature of legal representation encompasses "less than complete 
disclosure" and is "considered acceptable practice. 2 0' The Court noted that 
the statute did not "indicate, in terms that a person of common intelligence 
would understand, in what instances less than complete disclosure by an 
attorney becomes a criminal offense.202  Consequently, the Court 
concluded the statute was void for vagueness since it did "not provide20 3° 
adequate notice of the conduct by attorneys that it proscribes. 
Upon remand, the trial court dismissed the remaining charges against 
the Mark Marks firm due to "egregious" and "substantial" ex parte 
communications made by the prosecution to a judge who was later 
disqualified.20 4 The Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.0 5 
Significantly, while affirming the decision on due process grounds, the 
appellate court based its decision not only on the unfairness of the ex parte 
conduct but also on the unique role of attorneys as advocates for their 
clients: 
197 Amended Answer Brief ofMark Marks, supra note 195, at 6-7. 
198 Id. 
199 See Marks, 698 So. 2d at 537 ("The court found that as applied to attorneys 
representing their clients, the statute failed to provide sufficient notice and was susceptible to 
arbitrary enforcement."). 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 538. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 758 So. 2d 1131, 1134 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
205 Id. at 1137. 
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It is thus possible to advocate a very close case, one where the issue of negligence is 
cloudy or injuries are not indisputably related to the injury, yet not misrepresent 
anything to the insurer. In this circumstance, counsel can lawfully seek to advocate 
the client's position to achieve the maximum recovery available. Again we stress, 
counsel cannot commit a fraud on the insurer by misrepresenting facts counsel knows 
to be untrue. The problem is locating the demarcation between acceptable 
advocacy-a tolerable adversarial, hyperbolic presentation of inferences, implications 
and conclusions about symptoms, causes and effects-and unacceptable fraud by 
outright lying. The point at which advocacy passes from the one to the other may 
well be exceedingly beclouded in a given case, as where the facts point in both20 6 
directions. 
In 2002, the Florida Supreme Court denied a review of the Court of 
Appeals' decision, finally bringing the Marks prosecution to an end. By 
that time, the firm and the indicted attorney-defendants had spent thirteen 
years and millions of dollars in an effort to stay out of jail.20 7 Although a 
court ultimately awarded them partial recovery of their legal fees,20 8 their 
reputations had been irreparably tarnished and the Marks firm was unable to 
reopen. Although one can argue that the Marks firm and its lawyers 
ultimately won, a foreboding message had been sent to other Florida 
personal injury attorneys that state prosecutors were prepared to regulate 
insurance claim litigation practices through criminal prosecution. 
In some ways, it matters little whether prosecutions such as Marks's 
result in the ultimate vindication of the indicted attorneys. Even if 
prosecutions based on litigation practices do not result in convictions, the 
harm suffered by attorneys and law firms is incalculable both in terms of 
financial loss and loss of reputations. A rational lawyer would likely go a 
long way to avoid this type of scrutiny. This may include stepping away 
from overly zealous settlement negotiations and substantially lowering the 
settlement amount that had heretofore been justifiably sought. Lawyer-
client relationships are disrupted because a lawyer, whose fiduciary duty is 
.to his client, must now ascertain whether or not his performance will incur 
the ire of his insurance adversary and result in his referral for criminal 
prosecution. If such considerations by attorneys become systemic, the 
practice of personal injury law will be substantially restricted since lawyers 
will be less likely to aggressively litigate or pursue novel causes of action 
on behalf of clients. The net effect is that injured persons, particularly the 
poor, lose some portion of their access to the legal system. 
206 Id. at 1136. 
207 Marks v. Dep't of Legal Affairs, 937 So. 2d 1211, 1213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
208 Id. 
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IV. PRESERVING THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM: PROTECTING THE 
PLAINTIFFS' BAR AND INSURANCE CLAIMANTS FROM THE ALLIANCE'S 
CHILL 
A. DUE PROCESS AND EQUITY CONCERNS: THE NEED FOR 
SAFEGUARDS 
In its most rational reduction, the argument for using funds assessed 
from an industry to finance the investigation and prosecution of crimes 
against that industry's interests is based on the concept that such funding 
advances society's interest to the extent that those prosecutions had been 
foregone solely due to a lack of funds. 20 9 As such, providing a mechanism 
for funding is a public good as it allows for the prosecution of these crimes 
and the punishment of the guilty.210 The infusion of a payer independent 
from the state's general revenues, however, requires, at a minimum, 
recognition of the potential for improper conflicting interests influencing 
the prosecutor's discretion.21' 
Moreover, the Alliance structures as implemented by various states, 
described above, are not even simple funding mechanisms. They come 
with restrictions on use, creations of special bureaus, and formalized 
institutional engagenient between the prosecutor's offices, investigators 
(public, private, and "quasi-public"), and the funding industry (both as the 
victim and as a trade group). These structures have also led to perceptions 
of conflict. Therefore, it behooves us to further explore the constitutional 
considerations implicated by these processes in recognition of their relative 
recentness of inclusion in the criminal justice process. 
1. ConflictingInterests andTheir Due ProcessImplicationsfor Prosecutors 
It is fairly well accepted 212 that prosecutors must be, at least in some 
sense, impartial in their pursuit of justice.21 3 This unique responsibility, 
209 See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 704. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 698. 
212 Delineating the exact nature of the impartial prosecutor has been a favorite 
preoccupation of the courts. See Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 
1984) ("It is a bit easier to say what a disinterested prosecutor is not than what he is."). It 
has also been the subject of much excellent scholarship. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra 
note 10, at 850; Zacharias, Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?,supra note 104, at 57. 
213 The idea of the impartial prosecutor is linked to the requirement of a fair trial. See 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (describing the role of the prosecutor in the 
context of his representation of the governing people); Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 
1247 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that a criminal defendant is entitled "to an impartial prosecutor, 
who can make an unbiased use of all options available"); People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 
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which sets prosecutors apart from all other attorneys laboring within our 
adversarial system, was recognized by courts as early as 1935. In Bergerv. 
United States,2 14 the Supreme Court articulated the often-quoted principle 
that the state's "interest ...in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win 
a case, but that justice shall be done., 215 Accordingly, a prosecutor "isin a 
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law," and "[it] is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just 
one." 216 Thus, the Court identifies within our system of laws a unique role 
and responsibility for the prosecutor because "[tihe United States Attorney 
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a 
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its 
obligation to govern at all. 217 
To say that there is a requirement of an impartial prosecutor is not to 
say that the prosecutor does not have immense discretion in the undertaking 
of his duties, 218 nor that he is not entitled to prosecute his action with 
zeal.219 In no area is his discretion greater, for instance, than in the 
determination of whom to charge and how to conduct the case.220 In fact, 
315 (Cal. 1996) (noting "the nature of the impartiality required of the public prosecutor 
follows from the prosecutor's role as a representative of the People as a body, rather than as 
individuals"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2008) ("[A] prosecutor has the 
responsibility ofa minister ofjustice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility 
carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice."). 
In Massachusetts, the Ellis Court likewise did not dispute that the insurance fraud defendants 
had a right to "a fair trial, conducted by an impartial, disinterested prosecutor." 
Commonwealth v. Ellis, 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 678, at *11 (Super. Ct. 1998). 
214 295 U.S. at 78. 
215 Zacharias, CanProsecutorsDo Justice?,supranote 104, at 88. 
216 Id. 
217 Berger,295 U.S. at 78. 
218 The Supreme Court has granted great deference as to a prosecutor's determination of 
whom to prosecute. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (identifying 
the obligation of deference "to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute" in the 
normal course). This discretion is, of course, bound by the requirement that the prosecutor 
must have "probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute." See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). 
219 See Green & Zacharias, supranote 10, at 850-52. 
220 Generally, a motion for dismissal based on a claim of selective prosecution is the only 
mechanism whereby a defendant may challenge a charging determination. See Rumery, 480 
U.S. at 396; Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1981) (stating that charging is within 
prosecutor's discretion alone). But see In re Justices of the Super. Ct. Dep't of the Mass. 
Trial Ct., 218 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2000) (entertaining the notion of habeas relief). Nor is there 
a procedural mechanism by which a private citizen can challenge a prosecutor's refusal to 
bring charges against another. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) 
(finding no judicially cognizable interest of an individual person in the prosecution of 
another). 
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the courts are generally so deferential to this exercise of discretion that the 
only real check on prosecutors' power is the motion to dismiss based on the 
claim of selective prosecution, which is both extraordinarily limited in its 
scope and in its chances for success.221 
Such remarkable deference to prosecutorial discretion, however, can 
be seen as justified only in relation to the prosecutor's appropriate 
independence.222  Traditionally, prosecutorial independence inherently 
relies on the prosecutor's freedom from impermissible conflicts.223 In the 
event of identification of such an impermissible conflict, disqualification of 
the prosecutor is a potential remedy.224 Thus, while selective prosecution 
motions struggle under a relatively high burden, the courts seem more 
willing to support the disqualification of a conflicted prosecutor.225 
In any event, courts have looked to the ethical conflict rules to assist in 
their determination of improper prosecutorial conduct. The leading 
Supreme Court precedent on point is Young v. UnitedStates ex. reL Louis 
Vuitton et Fils S.A.,226 which considered the allowability of appointing 
private attorneys to prosecute a criminal contempt proceeding when those 
attorneys also represented the civil plaintiff who would benefit from the 
contempt proceeding.227 This was a true "private prosecutor" case, where 
the district court had appointed the civil plaintiffs lawyers as special 
221 Claims of selective prosecution require a showing not only of discriminatory effect in 
charging determinations, but also that the charge was deliberately based on an unjustifiable 
standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification. See United States v. Wayte, 
470 U.S. 598, 608-10 (1985); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). Discriminatory 
purpose is a high burden to meet, and has been held to imply "more than ... awareness of 
consequences. It implies that the decision-maker... selected or reaffirmed a particular 
course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon 
an identifiable group." Wayne, 470 U.S. at 610; see also Kennedy, supra note 8, at 667-78 
(discussing selective prosecution motions and finding them to "require a virtual admission of 
discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecutorial agency"). 
222 Prosecutorial freedom of action can be seen as supported by a parallel freedom from 
influence. See Kennedy, supranote 8, at 679 (characterizing trust in prosecutorial discretion 
as predicated on independence from any discrete private or governmental interest). 
223 Id. 
224 See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (disqualification of a 
prosecutor warranted due to personal interest). Penal codes may also incorporate the ability 
to disqualify a prosecutor for conflicts of interest. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1424 (West 
2007) (stating that disqualification may be granted if the evidence shows that a conflict of 
interests exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial). 
225 Bordenkircher,434 U.S. 357. 
226 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
227 The Young review arose from a challenge to a criminal contempt action brought for 
violation of a civil injunction prohibiting the making of counterfeit products by the civil 
defendant. Id. at 789-90. 
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228counsel to prosecute the criminal contempt action . The Supreme Court 
held that "counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not 
be appointed to undertake contempt prosecutions for alleged violations of 
2 29 
that order., 
While declining to embrace a per se rule prohibiting all private 
prosecutorial involvement in criminal cases, the Young Court recognized 
both the importance of potential conflicts of interests on the role of the 
prosecutor and the continued relevance of even the appearance of 
impropriety. The Court explained that regardless of whether the 
appointment of private counsel in that case had resulted in any actual 
prosecutorial impropriety, an issue on which they gave no opinion, that 
such an "appointment illustrates the potential for private interest to 
influence the discharge of public duty. '230 Further, the court identified the 
ability of the criminal contempt case to act as improper leverage on the 
other party in the resolution of their other civil claims: 
These claims theoretically could have created temptation to use the criminal 
investigation to gather information of use in those suits, and could have served as 
bargaining leverage in obtaining pleas in the criminal prosecution. In short, as will 
generally be the case, the appointment of counsel for an interested party to bring the 
contempt prosecution in this case at a minimum createdopportunities for conflicts to 
arise, and created at least the appearanceof impropriety. 
Many of the Justices were well aware of the extreme disadvantage to 
the defendant which results from the appointment of an interested 
prosecutor. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, noted in concurrence that "[w]e have held that some errors 'are so 
228 Id. at 791. 
229 Id. at 790. Young is a particularly difficult case to parse as a result of the numerous 
different points of concurrence and dissent among the justices. The majority agreed that 
private attorneys may not prosecute contempt charges when their client is a beneficiary of 
that court order. Id. at 790. However, the justices split on the issue of the appropriate 
remedy for that violation; Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, was joined by Justices 
Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun in concluding the error as sufficiently fundamental so as to 
require a per se reversal. Id. at 809-14. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justice O'Connor, dissented from both the judgment and the fundamental error analysis, 
concluding that the case should have been remanded for a determination on the appointment 
as under harmless error analysis. See id. at 825-27. It was only as a result of Justice Scalia's 
separate concurring opinion that per se reversal was granted. Id. at 815. This concurrence, 
however, was grounded in his opinion that the appointment of a contempt prosecutor by a 
federal district court constituted a violation of the separation of powers between the judiciary 
and the executive branch. Id. at 815. 
230Young, 481 U.S. at 805. A conflict of interest can also be seen to effect objectivity. 
See Vasquez v. Hillary, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986) (noting that prosecution by an attorney 
with conflicting interests "calls into question the objectivity of those charged with bringing a 
defendant to judgment"). 
231Young, 481 U.S. at 806. 
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fundamental and pervasive that they require reversal without regard to the 
facts or circumstances of the particular case.',, 232  Those Justices then 
concluded "that the appointment of an interested prosecutor is such an 
233 
error." 
The Young decision is also useful in helping us distinguish between 
two types of interests that are often conjoined when discussing 
prosecutorial neutrality. The majority reiterated the distinction between 
finding an arrangement that creates an actual conflict of interest and finding 
the existence of actual misconduct. They noted that "[a]n arrangement 
represents an actual conflict of interest if its potential for misconduct is 
deemed intolerable. The determination whether there is an actual conflict 
of interest is therefore distinct from the determination of whether there was
234 
actual misconduct., 
The Court also appears to have sought to distinguish between two 
distinct scenarios where a prosecutor's required impartiality may be 
impaired-situations of overzealousness by the prosecutor and situations of 
divided loyalty: 
It is true that prosecutors may on occasion be overzealous and become overly 
committed to obtaining conviction. That problem, however, is personal, not 
structural ....[S]uch overzealousness "does not have its roots in a conflict of 
interest. When it manifests itself the court deals with it on a case-by-case basis as an 
aberration. This is quite different from approving a practice which would permit the 
appointment of prosecutors whose undivided loyalty is pledged to a party interested 
only in a conviction. 235 
We can discern from Young that situations of impaired loyalty can be 
seen to be substantially graver than the case of mere overzealousness.236 To 
conclude that a relationship creates a structural "problem" is very close to 
determining that it is the type of situation warranting the appellation of a 
232 Id. at 809-10 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
233 Id.at 810. 
234 Id. at 808 & n.18. 
235 I. 
236 Overzealousness can best be understood as focusing on the prosecutor's personal 
motivations. See Kennedy, supra note 8, at 683 (describing issues of overzealousness as 
concerning threats to impartiality "posed by the prosecutor's own interests in the outcome of 
the case") (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court's handling of the issue of zealousness 
as a personal conflict is best illustrated by its analysis in Marshall v. Jerrico,446 U.S. 238 
(1980). In that case, the Court rejected a defendant's contention that the government agency 
performing certain prosecutorial functions violated his due process rights as a result of their 
interest in collecting the money penalties allowed under the statute. Id. at 251-52. The 
Court noted that its due process evaluation might have been significantly different if the 
alleged over-prosecution had singled out any specific groups. Id. at n. 12. 
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"structural defect in the trial mechanism," and, as such, would support those 
Justices who concurred in finding the appointment per se reversible.237 
Although the Young decision rested on the Supreme Court's inherent 
supervisory power and considerations of prosecutorial ethics rather than 
constitutional due process, the Court often uses its supervisory authority to 
strike down an unlawful procedure as a precursor to finding that such 
practice amounts to a due process violation.238 The Tennessee courts, 
construing the right to prosecutorial impartiality in light of Young, have 
concluded that it "does not preclude and probably only foreshadows a 
constitutional bar" with respect to the involvement of private prosecutors in 
239 criminal cases. 
In subsequent cases, other courts interpreting Young have held that the 
Due Process Clause mandates substantial restrictions on the activities of 
private prosecutors. The judicially imposed restrictions include 
requirements that private attorneys work under the direction of public 
prosecutors and that they not be permitted to "effectively control critical 
prosecutorial decisions ...[such as] whether to prosecute, what targets of 
prosecution to select, what investigative powers to utilize [and] what 
sanctions to seek., 240 Other jurisdictions have held that private prosecutors 
with certain interests, such as representing victims who also have civil 
237See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) (finding that "structural defects 
in the trial mechanism... defy harmless error standards"). 
238See Bessler, supra note 90, at 572 (noting that, in United States v. Hale,422 U.S. 13 
(1975), the Supreme Court exercised its supervisory power in reversing a conviction based 
on a defendant's silence after being given Mirandawarnings). A year after Hale, in Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court enshrined the right to remain silent as a due process 
right. Similarly, in Offutt v. UnitedStates, 388 U.S. 11 (1954), the Supreme Court, pursuant 
to its supervisory authority, reversed a criminal contempt conviction because of judicial bias. 
Subsequently, in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), the Supreme Court ruled that 
conducting a criminal contempt trial before a personally affronted judge violated due 
process. For a general discussion of the Court's supervisory power, see Aviva Abramovsky, 
Traitorsin Our Midst: Attorneys Wo Inform on Their Clients, 2 U. PA. J. CONST'L L. 676, 
703-05 (2000). 
239See State v. Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775, 782 (Tenn. App. 1997) (citing Bessler, supra 
note 90, at 571). Indeed, other commentators have simply described the decision as 
essentially employing a due process analysis while using supervisory authority. See 
Kennedy, supra note 8, at 681-82. 
240 See Erikson v. Pawnee County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th 
Cir. 2001); see also Stumbo v. Seabold, 704 F.2d 910, 911 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that 
Kentucky law allowing private prosecutors to assist in litigating criminal cases did not create 
a per se due process violation because the statute required public prosecutors to retain full 
control of the trial); State v. Imperiale, 773 F. Supp. 747, 750-51 (D.N.J. 1991) (finding that 
use ofprivate prosecutors implicates a defendant's "due process right to a fundamentally fair 
trial" and that a town attorney with potential civil interests in the outcome of the criminal 
proceeding was disqualified from acting as prosecutor). 
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claims against the defendant, are disqualified per se from taking part in the 
criminal litigation.24' Moreover, Justice Blackmun, concurring in Young, 
simply concluded that the private prosecution in that case was "a violation 
of due process., 242  He further stated that due process "requires a 
disinterested prosecutor with the unique responsibility to serve the public, 
rather than a private client, and to seek justice that is unfettered. 243 
The progeny of Young generally pertain to direct participation of 
private prosecutors in the criminal justice system, with a concomitant 
review of their personal loyalty or financial interests, rather than indirect 
funding of public prosecutors by private financial benefactors.244 The non-
existence of a formalized attorney-client relationship, however, does not 
preclude the arising of conflicts of interest; nor is the interest or obligation 
causing a conflict necessarily restricted to an individual, rather than 
institutional, analysis.245 The Supreme Court of California, determining the 
propriety of a prosecutorial disqualification under their state's recusal 
statute, has already recognized that the "tie that binds the prosecutor to an 
interested person may be compelling though it derives from the 
prosecutor's institutional objectives or obligations. 246 The need for a 
prosecutor free from the potential conflict of loyalties implicated by these 
Alliance systems seems sufficient to mitigate in favor of a broadening of 
the due process protections afforded a criminal defendant by many states in 
the conflicted private prosecutor scenario. As Justice Frankfurter 
expressed, due process is a living doctrine: 
Due process is not confined in its scope to the particular forms in which rights have 
heretofore been found to have been curtailed for want of procedural fairness. Due 
process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole constitutional system. 
While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past• in assuring fundamental justice, it is247 
also a living principle not confined to past instances. 
241 See, e.g., Cantrell v. State, 329 S.E.2d 22, 26 (Va. 1985) (finding a per se due process 
violation where "the position of a private prosecutor having a civil interest in the 
case... infects the prosecution with the possibility that private vengeance has been 
substituted for impartial application of the criminal law"). 
242 481 U.S. 787, 815 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
243 Id. 
244 But see People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 319-320 (Cal. 1996) ("No reason is 
apparent why a public prosecutor's impartiality could not be impaired by institutional 
interests, as by personal ones."). 
245 Id. at 320. 
246 Id. 
247 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 173-74 (1951). 
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2. InstitutionalBias as Threat to ProsecutorialNeutrality 
As described above, Massachusetts and many of the majority model 
states institutionalize the use of a specific industry's funds for the 
prosecution of a crime-insurance fraud-which specifically benefits the 
financial interests of a specific group-insurance companies. Let us 
consider a state which requires the assessed funds be kept in a distinct trust 
account and that those funds be used exclusively to advance the purposes of 
that state's insurance fraud prevention act. Could this arrangement alone be 
sufficient to implicate the question of divided loyalties at issue in cases like 
Young? In other words, could the structure of that arrangement be such that 
the assessed party's interests conceivably could result in the prosecutors' 
systemic identification with the funding industry to the point of potential 
conflict? 
Reasonably, that question seems to suggest an affirmative response. 
As discussed earlier, at least one prosecutor has recognized that the Alliance 
structure he labored under created a sufficient potential conflict of interest 
such that he chose to recuse himself from prosecuting insurance company-
retained medical professionals, and such that the Massachusetts IFB 
routinely turned away investigating cases of insurer fraud based on 
perceived potential conflicts. 248 Thus, the absence of a formal attorney-
client relationship already has not precluded self-identification of a conflict. 
Hence, there should be little discomfort with addressing the existence of 
that conflict systemically. Nor is this type of conflict best seen as extant in 
only those cases adverse to insurance-funded interests. If such conflict is 
recognized, it can only continue to exist in prosecutions favoring the 
funding interest. As has been argued in the context of Virginia private 
prosecutions, "[r]estricting the scope of participation of the private 
prosecutor cannot alter the nature of the conflict ...because the private 
[party's] interests remain a factor" in prosecutorial decision-making.249 
Moreover, there is precedent for concluding that the influence of non-
client financial backers can corrupt criminal advocacy. Courts have 
repeatedly recognized, in the criminal defense context, that "benefactor 
payments" by third parties with an interest in the outcome of the proceeding 
can create a practical conflict of loyalties.25 ° In particular, such payments
"may subject an attorney to undesirable outside influence and raise[] an 
248 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. 
249 Matthew S.Nichols, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Arguments Against Private 
Prosecutors, 13 CAP. DEF. J.279,294 (2001). 
250 See, e.g., United States v.Locascio,6 F.3d 924, 932 (2d Cir. 1993) (describing a 
traditional "house counsel" scenario where certain attorneys were retained on an ongoing 
basis to represent members of the same alleged mafia crime family). 
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ethical question as to whether the attorney's loyalties are with the client or
' 251the payor. 
Courts in such circumstances have thus looked beyond the technical 
nonexistence of an attorney-client relationship between the defense lawyer 
and the third party to find a conflict of interest, and indeed occasionally 
concluded that such a conflict is unwaivable.252 The same reasoning would 
dictate that ongoing benefactor payments by insurance carriers to public 
prosecutors create a similar de facto conflict, regardless of whether those 
payments are sanctioned by the legislature. It is the impermissible conflict 
of loyalties, not merely the fear of lost future earnings, which caused the 
court to rule such arrangements impermissible in the defense context. 
Mandatory as opposed to voluntary payments, therefore, should not be seen 
to diminish the risk of impermissible prosecutor loyalty to the insurance 
industry. The identification of even a systemic risk that a prosecutor would 
view his funding industry as sufficiently "client-like" or otherwise 
sufficiently influential so as to require his recusal-as occurred in 
Massachusetts-supports recognition of at least the existence of potential 
conflicts of interest in the Alliance system.
253 
The right to prosecutorial impartiality and Massachusetts Alliance-
initiated prosecutions' potential infringement of that right were both at issue 
in the Ellis prosecution. Though the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts did not find the Alliance relationship impermissible, the 
court did reiterate that the Massachusetts constitution guarantees an 
impartial prosecutor, "in the sense that the prosecutor must not be nor 
appear to be influenced ...either by his or her personal interests or by a 
person or entity to whom the prosecution of a criminal case will or may 
bring significant benefits. 254 The court held the Massachusetts scheme, 
however, did not sufficiently influence prosecutorial decision-making so as 
to be deemed improper. The court determined "the only obligation of the 
division [was] to review each IFB report" and "[t]he statute le[ft] further 
investigation and any decision to prosecute exclusively in the division's
255 
control. 
251Id. (quoting In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served upon John Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 248 n.6 
(2d Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
252See id.; see also Aviva Abramovsky, The EnterpriseModel of ManagingConflicts of 
Interestin the Tripartite Insurance Defense Relationship, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 193 (2005).
253See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 US 279, 308 (1991) ("[S]tructural defects... defy 
analysis by harmless error standards."); see also Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 
1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ("[T]he practical impossibility of establishing that the conflict has 
worked to defendant's disadvantage dictates the adoption of standards under which a 
reasonable potential for prejudice will suffice."). 
254Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644, 650 (Mass. 1999). 
255 Id. at 652. 
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The question of "control," however, somewhat misstates the nature of 
the conflict implicated. As an ethical consideration it is not simply a 
question of whether the interest implicated requires the prosecutor to act in 
a specific way, but rather whether the nature of the relationship increases 
the likelihood that, as a result of some other obligation or interest, the right 
to a fair trial is implicated.2 56 The consequence of financing to create some 
sense of obligation has been recognized by other courts when considering 
disqualification of a prosecutor." 7 
The court in Ellis emphasized the fact that the relationship between the 
prosecution and the insurance industry had been legislatively mandated. 
Specifically, the court stated: 
If we were confronted with a challenge to an arrangement between insurers and the 
Attorney General of the sort involved here that was not endorsed by statute, the 
appearanceofthe possibility of improper influence would be far clearer. Although 
statutory endorsement of an unconstitutional plan cannot make it constitutional, where 
the question is whether the appearance of an arrangement may support a 
determination of unconstitutionality, the fact that the Legislature has endorsed the 
plan, has supervisory authority over it, and appropriates funds for it substantially 
changes appearances. 
Moreover, legislative mandate arguably should be insufficient in 
isolation to remove the "appearance of impropriety" inherent to the Alliance 
structure, particularly when it is the legislative creation of the relationship 
which is the cause of the perception of impropriety. Simply, a legislative 
mandate does not reduce the potential for prejudice to prosecutorial 
neutrality, particularly if the prejudice is seen as arising naturally from the 
structure of the relationship itself. In this respect, it is obvious that an 
industry responsible, voluntarily or not, for an office's funding has more 
than the mere appearance of influence. 259 The appearance of influence may 
be reinforced by the enabling legislation, which requires the IFB and its 
funded prosecutors to investigate and prosecute insurance fraud cases 
referred largely by the insurance companies themselves. Further, the 
appearance of influence is buttressed in Massachusetts by the legislative 
assessments being placed on two associations of insurance companies 
whose continued existence is determined solely by the member insurance 
companies. It seems apparent that a prosecutor might try to curry favor 
256 The concept of significant risk has always been central to the identification of a 
conflict of interest. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2008) ("A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if... (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or 
more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a 
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.") (emphasis added). 
257 See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 319-20 (Cal. 1996). 
258 Ellis, 708 N.E.2d at 652 (emphasis added). 
259 See MATA Brief,supra note 95, at 38. 
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with the insurance industry out of fear that the industry would withdraw 
funding by simply dissolving the organizations.260  If the industry 
organizations ceased to exist, there could be no assessment and those 
attorney general positions could foreseeably be terminated. Economic self-
interest is the greatest of motivators and a long-recognized source of 
conflicting interests. 
The Ellis court dismissed possible insurance industry dissolution of the 
assessed organizations as speculative because the legislature could amend 
the statute to mandatorily assess the insurance companies based on the 
amount of business they transact. 261 This position is flawed in a variety of 
respects. Principally, such a legislative response is itself merely speculative 
and does little to cure any current problem of inappropriate influence. 
Moreover, it ignores both the vagaries of the political system as well as the 
lobbying power of the insurance industry, both of which make it unlikely 
that the legislature would enact laws contravening the insurance industry's 
perceived interests in the prosecution of insurance fraud. Furthermore, the 
court's holding ignores the greater issue of the manner in which the 
Alliance scheme permits insurance companies to be the initiators of 
mandatory investigations, thereby abrogating a portion of executive 
discretion. Insurance fraud department employees and the prosecutors who 
work with them reasonably internalize this shift of initiating authority. As a 
shift in interest also implicates the likelihood of influence on prosecutorial 
neutrality, legislative mandate cannot salvage such a defect regardless of 
the particular funding system legislatively imposed. 
Ellis relied on yet another particularly dubious ground in validating the 
Massachusetts scheme: the fact that the bureau and its related prosecutorial 
office were funded by the insurance industry collectively rather than by 
individual companies. The "dilution" of influence cited by the Ellis court is 
largely fictitious, particularly in the insurance industry. Although 
individual insurance carriers have varying interests in particular fraud cases, 
the industry is united in several material respects, including a general 
benefit to be acquired from reduced claims and a chilled plaintiffs' bar.
262 
Moreover, insurance companies, as a result of their unique regulatory 
system, have great experience working together on industry-wide goals and 
projects. Accordingly, even though the cost of the various assessments may 
be distributed among many companies doing business in any given 
260 See Rebecca A. Pinto, The Public Interest and Private Financing of Criminal 
Prosecutions,77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1343, 1367 n.130 (1999). 
261 See Ellis, 708 N.E.2d at 651. 
262 See Kennedy, supranote 8, at 622-23. 
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jurisdiction, such "dilution" is insignificant when the goals of and benefits 
to the industry from fraud prosecutions are so uniform. 
Ellis therefore seems to interpret unreasonably the requirement of a 
"disinterested prosecutor" as mandated by the Supreme Court in Young. 
Although Young dealt with the narrower circumstance of the appointment 
of special counsel in a criminal contempt proceeding, the same principles of 
prosecutorial impartiality should preclude continuation of the 
Massachusetts IFB program. Simply put, the indirect involvement of 
insurance carriers through benefactor-type payments to criminal 
investigators and offices of attorneys general creates a de facto conflict of 
interest that damages prosecutorial impartiality. 
Indeed, such a conflict can rationally be expected to occur in any 
situation where the insulation of an investigator or prosecutor as true public 
servants working with public funds is replaced by a scheme in the particular 
interest of the funding party. As evidenced by the Massachusetts 
prosecutors' own recusal, prosecutors can easily come to see their funding 
industry in a quasi-client (or some other equally impermissible) fashion.263 
Such a scenario unreasonably decreases the likelihood a defendant will 
receive a neutral prosecutor. 
Fundamental equality concerns are likewise implicated in the Alliance 
system and left unaddressed by the Ellis court. Among its corrupting 
features is that institutionalized entrance into the Alliance is restricted to 
insurance companies. As Professor Joseph E. Kennedy warned, 
"preferential access to justice for monied interests.. . threatens the 
defendant's distinct interest in equality. 264 Although he sardonically noted 
that "no defendant has a right to a fiscally strapped prosecutor," he 
emphasized that "the prospect of defendants facing disproportionate 
prosecution by the government based on the wealth of their accusers is 
troubling. 265  This conclusion was echoed by the Supreme Court of 
California regarding the use of private third-party funds for investigative 
purposes when it stated, "A system in which affluent victims, including 
prosperous corporations, were assured of prompt attention from the district 
263 See supranotes 110-12 and accompanying text. 
264 Kennedy, supra note 8, at 707. 
265 Id. Nor should the ability of wealth to increase the negative treatment of those 
already politically disempowered as a function of wealth be ignored. See id. ("The powers 
wielded by government are considerable, as is the cost of merely being accused by the 
government of criminal conduct. To the degree that the wealthy would enjoy a superior 
ability to unleash these forces on those who offend their interests, inequalities of political 
power that already exist as a function of wealth would be exacerbated."). 
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attorney's office, while crimes against the poor went unprosecuted, would 
neither deserve nor receive the confidence of the public. 266 
B. SAFEGUARDING THE PLAINTIFFS' BAR: A NECESSARY AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY 
A persuasive argument can be made that the Alliance system creates a 
substantive threat to any insurance fraud defendant's due process rights and 
that such a problem is so systemic as to require its elimination. However, 
since no court as of yet has found the Alliance system to be constitutionally 
defective, its particular implications to the plaintiffs' bar may be 
ameliorated in the interim by some lesser prophylactic administrative 
remedy. As lawyers prosecuted for insurance fraud are charged as a result 
of actions undertaken in their capacity as lawyers, the "buffer" proposal, 
discussed in the next section, contends that their behavior most 
appropriately should first be reviewed by the agencies charged with 
determining the correctness of attorney conduct as a question of 
professional responsibility. 
It may legitimately be asked why the prosecution of an attorney for 
insurance fraud should require such regulatory review as part of a criminal 
proceeding. The regulation of the legal profession has frequently been 
deemed not only a legitimate government interest, but a compelling one. 67 
As such, despite possible equal protection concerns, a legislative scheme 
that treats attorneys differently from other criminal defendants can be 
justified if a rational basis exists for providing them with added 
protection. 268 
266 See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 318 (Cal. 1996). 
267 See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar Assn., 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975). 
268 The Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution ensures that "all persons similarly 
situated should be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985). When state action implicates a fundamental right or involves a suspect 
classification, such as race, a classification will "receive the strictest scrutiny under the 
Equal Protection Clause." Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 293 (2004). However, where 
state action does not concern a suspect classification or a fundamental right, even 
intentionally unequal treatment will be upheld unless "there is no rational basis for the 
difference in treatment." Vill. ofWillowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 
In Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), the Supreme Court addressed the question of how 
rational basis review is to be applied to similarly situated persons: 
The initial discretion to determine what is "different" and what is "the same" resides in the 
legislatures of the states. A legislature must have substantial latitude to establish classifications 
that roughly approximate the nature of the problem perceived, that accommodate competing 
concerns both public and private, and that account for limitations on the practical ability of the 
state to remedy every ill. In applying the equal protection clause to most forms of state action, 
we thus seek only the assurance that the classification at issue bears some fair relationship to a 
legitimate public purpose. 
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court's discussion in In re Grimme of 
the public's ongoing interest in the protection of lawyers from, among other 
things, frivolous or retaliatory litigation is particularly relevant to our 
discussion.269 That court upheld a statute allowing licensed psychologists to 
be subject to a lesser standard of proof than attorneys in license revocation 
proceedings. The court held that applying a preponderance of the evidence 
standard for psychologists, as opposed to the stricter clear and convincing 
evidence standard the state used in attorney proceedings, was not a 
violation of psychologists' right to equal protection, despite the added 
protection it afforded attorneys. The court stated that "the State is free to 
treat professions differently according to the needs of the public in relation 
to each," and reasoned that there existed a reasonable basis for the 
distinction based on the inherent differences in the nature of the two 
professions.27° 
Id.at 216. 
Similar principles have been used to justify differential treatment of various professions 
under the criminal law in order to safeguard legitimate regulatory or societal interests. In 
Davilav. Yates, No. C05-4614SI, 2006 WL 1867635 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 5, 2006), the defendant, 
a contractor, asserted that a California criminal statute violated his right to equal protection 
under the law since it punished contracting without a license as a felony, while similar 
criminal statutes penalized other licensing crimes as misdemeanors. Applying rational basis 
review, the court held it was "left with no other choice than to conclude that the 
classification of fraudulent use of a contractor's license as a felony is rationally related to a 
legitimate government purpose." Id.at *25. Other statutes that differentiate on the basis of 
professional classification have similarly been upheld under the rational basis review 
standard. See, e.g., Pushkin v. Califano, 600 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Bussey v. 
Harris, 611 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1980) (denial of Medicare reimbursement to physician 
assistants found rational). Moreover, a regulation allowing different treatment of architects 
and engineers (as opposed to other persons) to streamline the building permit process was 
found to have a rational basis. Levine v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 3119, 2002 WL 
5588 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2002). In Georgia, a statute setting forth attorney fee arbitration rules 
were found to be constitutional. Nodvin v. State Bar of Ga., 544 S.E.2d 142 (Ga. 2001). 
That court ruled that attorneys were not a suspect class and requiring attorneys to justify 
their fees in front of an arbitration panel was rationally related to the legitimate goal of 
maintaining confidence in the legal system. Id. at 560. 
269 635 A.2d 461 (N.H. 1993). 
270 Particularly, the court noted that the legal profession is distinct in that attorneys are 
involved in an adversarial process and a higher standard of proof may discourage frivolous 
claims by disgruntled losing parties. As an adversarial relationship is uncharacteristic in the 
psychological profession, the court found a higher standard was not necessary in 
psychologist disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, the court reasoned that the nature of an 
attorney's work is more public than the work of a psychologist since it creates an inevitable 
paper trail. In psychology, sessions are held in private without the presence of third party 
witnesses. Consequently, misconduct on the part of a psychologist is more difficult to prove. 
Because of these inherent differences in the nature of the professions, the court determined 
that the lower burden of proof survived rational basis review and did not violate equal 
protection. Id. at 462. 
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Given that a vigorous plaintiffs' bar is necessary to the integrity of the 
tort justice system, there is clearly a legitimate societal interest in offering 
protection to attorneys against unfounded or premature criminal charges. 
Even medical professionals are not subject to the same degree of disruption 
should they come under criminal investigation in the course of their 
practice. Doctors can continue to treat their patients if their files are 
subpoenaed, but the files of law firms are at the very heart of the 
representation process and any premature compromise of such records' 
confidentiality can severely damage the attorney-client relationship. It can 
thus be argued that the unique effect of insurance fraud charges on the legal 
profession merits a greater degree of procedural protection for accused 
lawyers than for others indicted for similar crimes. The disruption that such 
charges cause to the plaintiffs' bar, and to the clients themselves, is 
different in both degree and kind from the effect on other professional 
relationships. For this reason, a variety of legislative approaches are 
possible. However, in the interim, the next Part suggests a procedural 
judicial response. 
C. AN ADMINISTRATIVE BUFFER: BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF 
CRIME PREVENTION AND EFFECTIVE CIVIL JUSTICE 
The judiciary, to its credit, has been aware of the problematic aspects 
of the Alliance, and has in some instances been willing to mitigate attorney 
harm resulting from insurance fraud investigations. 27' For instance, the 
California courts have offered protections relating to attorney-client 
privilege and work product doctrine when attorneys' files are seized 
pursuant to a search warrant issued as part of a criminal investigation of 
alleged insurance fraud. 72 In People v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
(Lafi,273 the Supreme Court of California upheld the right of attorneys who 
were under investigation for automobile insurance fraud to have a special 
master, appointed by the trial court, determine which of the seized 
documents were subject to either attorney-client privilege or the work 
product doctrine.274 The court held that, even though the matter had not 
271 People v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 23 P.3d 563 (2001) (authorizing appointment of 
a special master to review seized documents to determine privilege).
272 Id. at 735-37. 
273 Id. 
274 In a subsequent case, People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Weitzman, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
165 (Ct. App. 2003), a qui tam civil action eventually lost by Allstate in order to recover 
funds on behalf of the state allegedly defrauded by the Laff scheme, the court included a 
letter to a Los Angeles newspaper describing the aggressive nature of the search: 
An October 9, 1996, letter published in the Los Angeles Daily Journal responded to the October 
1 article. It described the execution of the search warrant at Mr. Laff's office as follows: 
A VIVA ABRAMO VSKY [Vol. 98 
been referred to a criminal court proceeding at the time, both mandates of 
the privilege and its inherent authority authorized the trial court's use of the 
special master.27 5 
Remedies such as those created by the Laff court, however, are at best 
incomplete. Although the court was willing to appoint a special master for 
determinations of privilege, the evaluation of attorney professional conduct 
as part of the fraud is generally left to the trial mechanism alone.276 To the 
extent that attorneys may limit their actions as a result of their perceptions 
of potential conflicts or other perceptions of influence, a more 
comprehensive safeguard is justified to protect the crucial role of the 
plaintiffs' bar in insurance fraud litigation.277 
Obviously, the most comprehensive remedy against the dangers of the 
Alliance would be to strike down all private insurance industry financing of 
criminal investigations and prosecutions, and remove the special status 
granted the insurance industry in triggering investigations as part of the 
current Alliance system. This, however, would require either legislative 
reform or judicial interpretation opposite of that announced in Ellis. It is 
unrealistic to conclude that either of these eventualities will occur in the 
near future. 
One potential remedy for the Alliance's distortion of the criminal 
justice system was, ironically, suggested by the prosecution in the Marks 
case. 278 In that case, Marks's counsel had argued to the Florida Supreme 
Court that the statute under which the law firm was being prosecuted 
"Approximately 30 flak-jacketed 'officers,' with guns drawn, came running down office 
hallways and barged into Mr. Laffs offices to serve the search warrant. What Mr. Kass 
[Financial's attorney] was overseeing was, in effect, 'discovery' by Gestapo tactics. [ ] I hav[e] 
nothing to do with Mr. Laff or any of the issues or subject matter of the underlying case. 
However, it may well be prophetic for all in society when, as one of the officers was leaving at 
the end of the day, he said to me in the hall as the elevator door closed, 'We're coming for you 
next."' 
Id. at 170 (citing Letters to the Editor, "Gestapo Tactics" Used in Law Office Search, L.A. 
DAILY J., Oct. 9, 1996, at 7). 
275 Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 25 Cal. 4th at 735-37. This reflects Supreme Court 
jurisprudence regarding the importance of the attorney-client privilege. See United States v. 
Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 568-75 (1989) (holding that before documents claimed to be covered by 
this privilege may be subjected to an in camera review by the judge to ascertain if the crime-
fraud exception may be validly invoked, the state must make an evidentiary showing 
plausibly implicating the possible application of the crime-fraud exception to attorney-client 
privilege). 
276 See United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994). 
277 The use of procedural reforms in the prosecution of lawyers is one manner by which 
"possible prosecutorial misuse of the criminal law" and the "criminalizing [of] socially 
desirable and professionally accepted lawyer conduct" may be guarded against. See 
Wolfram, supranote 15, at 76. 
278 Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 191, at 10. 
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violated the equal protection clauses of the United States and Florida 
constitutions since it penalized nondisclosures by attorneys and insurance 
claimants but not by insurance carriers.279 In response, the prosecutor 
argued that, although prevention of fraud and bad faith by insurance 
companies was as worthy a goal as preventing fraud by claimants, the 
insurance carriers could be effectively regulated via civil and administrative 
means.2 80 The Marks firm's response was that the distinction drawn by the 
prosecution was specious, since attorneys were also subject to a similar 
regulatory system.281 
The Florida Supreme Court did not resolve this equal protection issue, 
since it decided in favor of the Marks firm on vagueness grounds.282 The 
interplay of the prosecution and defense briefs, however, suggests a method 
by which a buffer may be placed between the insurance industry and 
financially motivated prosecutions of plaintiffs' attorneys. Attorneys are 
officers of the court and are subject to discipline by the judicial system and 
its designees. 283 Moreover, as the Marks prosecution argued, administrative 
regulation by expert bodies can be an effective method of policing an 
279 Cross-Reply Brief of Marvin Marks, supranote 172, at 7. 
280 Reply Brief of Petitioner, supra note 191, at 10 ("[C]laimants and insurance 
companies occupy substantially different legal positions. Insurance companies are heavily 
regulated by the State. Unfair trade practices and unfair settlement practices are prohibited. 
Fraudulent acts by insurers could result in the loss of licenses to conduct business in the 
State. If insurers fail to settle a legitimate claim, they can be held liable for excess verdicts 
for bad faith. Claimants and their attorneys are not subject to these regulations."). 
281 Cross-Reply Brief of Marvin Marks, supra note 172, at 9 ("The State also argues that 
the insurance fraud statute need not apply equally to insurance companies because insurance 
companies are regulated by the State .... The conduct of attorneys, physicians and 
operators of hospitals are similarly regulated by appropriate licensing authorities and they all 
bear the same risk of losing their licenses. In fact, the [Florida] insurance fraud statute itself 
provides that in addition to criminal penalties... [a]ttorneys who commit fraud 
are.. . subject to disciplinary proceedings and risk the loss of their license to practice law, 
under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Thus, the State's urged distinction is 
nonexistent.").
282 See State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1997). 
283 See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 490-92 (N.Y. 1928) (expressing the 
role of attorneys as officers of the court and reiterating the long tradition of attorney 
discipline as the proper province of the judiciary). In that decision, Benjamin Cardozo 
reviews the regulatory authority of courts in the disciplining of lawyers within the common 
law system from the Middle Ages in Britain to the modern era in New York. Id. at 490-92. 
For an excellent analysis of attorney discipline systems, see Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The 
Revised Lawyer DisciplineProcess in Arkansas:A Primerand Analysis, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L. REv. 13 (1998); Jennifer M. Kraus, Attorney DisciplineSystems: Improving Public 
Perception and Increasing Efficacy, 84 MARQ. L. REv. 273 (2000); Leslie C. Levin, The 
Casefor Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2007); Fred C. 
Zacharias, The PurposesofLawyer Discipline,45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 675 (2003). 
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industry's ethics. 284 Consequently, just as the Marks prosecutor urged that 
state regulatory agencies are useful in determining alleged malfeasance by 
insurance carriers, the attorney disciplinary board of each state could be an 
option for initial review of allegations that the professional conduct of 
lawyers constituted insurance fraud. 
The proposed "buffer" system would involve offering the appropriate 
disciplinary agency the opportunity to first review the lawyer's conduct as a 
regulatory matter.285 Though this system would be best effectuated by 
legislation, the courts could potentially use their inherent authority286 to 
seek guidance from these disciplinary committees as a sort of special master 
to assist in their inquiries. Since attorneys' conduct is regulated by an 
existing, comprehensive professional disciplinary scheme generally 
constituted under the judiciary's supervisory powers, the criminal courts 
could incorporate these disciplinary boards as a source of initial inquiry 
when vetting allegations of insurance fraud. 
In effect, the court would stay the criminal proceedings at a very early 
stage and refer the case to the appropriate disciplinary agency which would 
effectively play the role of a special master in determining whether there 
were sufficient indicia of fraudulent conduct to warrant criminal 
penalties.287 Where allegedly fraudulent conduct committed by attorneys 
implicates common litigation practices of the plaintiffs' bar, as in Marks, 
284 See Reply Brief of Petitioner, supranote 191, at 10. 
285 This could be accomplished under a procedure analogous to abstention in federal 
courts. See generally Lewis Yelin, Burford Abstention in FederalActionsfor Damages, 99 
COLUM. L. REv. 1871 (1999) (providing an overview of the abstention doctrine). While most 
federal abstention doctrines are grounded in comity between federal and state governments, 
others are based on prudential considerations such as efficient administration of justice and 
avoidance of unnecessary constitutional litigation. See id. Among the grounds upon which 
federal courts may utilize their discretion to abstain is where exercise of jurisdiction might 
impair state regulatory systems. See Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). "Burford 
abstention" is appropriate where 
the particular regulatory scheme involves a matter of substantial public concern[,] ... is "the sort 
of complex, technical regulatory scheme to which the Burford abstention doctrine usually is 
applied," and [where] review of a party's claims would interfere with the state's efforts to 
establish and maintain a coherent regulatory policy. 
Chiropractic Am. v. LaVecchia, 180 F.3d 99, 105 (3d Cir. 1999). 
286 A court has the "inherent power to control and prevent the abuse of its process." See 
People v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 23 P.3d 563, 570 (2001). This authority "extends to 
appointing special masters to perform subordinate judicial duties." Id. at 585. 
287 Although special masters are usually used in the civil context, they are also used in 
criminal cases for such purposes as determining whether materials seized from attorneys' 
offices are privileged. FED. R. Civ. P. 53; Super. Ct. of Los Angeles, 23 P.3d at 586. 
Moreover, it has long been held that a court may instigate an inquiry as part of any "quasi-
administrative remedy whereby the court is given information that may move it to other acts 
thereafter." Culkin, 162 N.E. at 492. 
421 2008] AN UNHOLYALLIANCE 
considerations similar to those at stake in other regulatory offenses militate 
in favor of preliminary vetting by disciplinary tribunals.288 
Attorney disciplinary systems, rather than prosecutors in alliance with 
insurance companies, are better suited to determine the line between lawyer 
fraud and aggressive, though ethical, legal tactics. 289 Disciplinary boards 
have extensive experience resolving disputes in this area.290 Disciplinary 
committees, whether appointed by a court or by a state bar association, are 
composed primarily of attorneys and encounter questions of unethical 
conduct on a daily basis.2 9' In addition, they employ specialized 
investigative staff who are conversant with ethical matters. 292 The 
288 That in some jurisdictions violations of attorney discipline rules are prohibited as 
grounds for another cause of action in tort does not preclude this buffer system. Generally, 
such rules simply reflect the idea that ethical violations do not create private causes of 
actions in the clients or third parties. See Criton A. Constantinides, Note, Professional 
Ethics Codes in Court: Redefining the Social Contract Between the Public and the 
Professions, 25 GA. L. REV. 1327, 1356 (1991). There is no prohibition that the judiciary 
may not use information or decisions acquired from its own inquiries to assist it in other 
determinations. 
289 The evaluation of the professional conduct of lawyers has long been considered the 
proper domain of the courts and their various delegates. See Culkin, 162 N.E. at 493 ("If the 
house is to be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers, to 
do the noisome work.") 
290 See Levin, supra note 283, at 1 (stating that "[e]ach year state disciplinary agencies 
receive more than 125,000 lawyer discipline complaints against the 1.3 million lawyers in 
the United States"). 
291 See Zacharias, supra note 283, at 690 (noting that the actors implementing the 
disciplinary process-the rulemakers, the prosecutors, and the reviewing judges-are 
ordinarily are all lawyers). Lay participation in attorney discipline is, however, on the rise. 
Id.at n.54. 
292 See Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor'sClothes and Other Tales About the Standardsfor 
Imposing Lawyer DisciplineStandards, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (noting that "[m]ost 
state discipline agencies have full-time professional disciplinary counsel and investigators"). 
The most recent ABA comprehensive report on the state of disciplinary committees is 
known as the McKay Commission Report. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, COMMISSION 
ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (1992). The McKay Commission Report 
found that "almost without exception, disciplinary systems [were now] staffed by full-time 
professional disciplinary counsel having statewide jurisdiction." Id. 
The New York attorney discipline system, for instance, is typical of states that do not 
delegate disciplinary matters to bar associations. In New York, each of the four departments 
of the Appellate Division maintains a disciplinary committee that acts as an arm of the court. 
Each committee has a full-time staff of attorneys, investigators, and clerical personnel who 
receive complaints, "make an initial judgment whether a sufficient basis exists on whether to 
proceed with an investigation," and determine upon full investigation whether to commence 
formal or informal disciplinary proceedings. New York State Bar Association Legal 
Handbook, ch. 21, Attorney Discipline (2005), available at http://www. 
nysba.org/Content/NevigationMenu/PublicResources/UnhappywithaNYAttorney/Unhappy-
with aNYAt.htm. Pursuant to Section 90 of the New York State Judiciary Law, formal 
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committees are intimately familiar with both the relevant disciplinary rules 
and the customs and practices of the legal profession.293 Hence, they are 
uniquely suited to distinguish acceptable professional practice from 
fraudulent conduct. 
This is critical because courts have repeatedly recognized that the 
ethical obligations of attorneys accused of criminal conduct are key to 
determining whether they in fact acted with a criminal mental state.294 
Accordingly, courts have held that attorneys accused of insurance fraud are 
entitled to present evidence concerning the rules of professional ethics to 
support their claims that they acted in good faith and thereby lacked the 
necessary mental state to be guilty of an offense.295 
In a criminal court, where the jury is typically unfamiliar with legal 
ethics, expert testimony is used to prove adherence to the relevant 
professional rules. In United States v. Kelly,296 for instance, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that it was error to preclude an attorney charged with 
participating in a narcotics conspiracy from presenting expert proof 
regarding "his professional obligations as an attorney., 297 Specifically, the 
court held that the rules governing protection of client confidentiality as 
well as the duty of an attorney to counsel his clients against committing 
further crimes were relevant to the attorney's state of mind in conducting 
certain conversations in which he advised his clients not to consummate 
drug deals.298 He was, therefore, entitled to present proof on these issues as 
a "basis for his primary defense: that he acted not with criminal intent but 
within the legitimate bounds of legal representation. 299 
disciplinary proceedings are heard by one or more referees and are subject to review by the 
Appellate Division. 
293 The determinations of a disciplinary board are generally considered sufficiently 
expert that state courts will typically rely on the findings of the hearing panel when 
considering the disciplinary board's recommendation of sanctions. See Levin, supra note 
292, at 19. 
294 See United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1308-10 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that where 
"a lawyer's responsibility to the client collides with other rules of law," a complex "interplay 
of conflicting duties" is created, and there are often conflicting opinions about how the 
attorney should proceed). Thus, where professional standards "guide [the] conduct" of a 
lawyer who is accused of committing fraud in collusion with a client, "they are directly 
relevant to his intent." Id. 
295 Id. at 1309; see also United States v. Kellington, 217 F.3d 1084, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 
2000); United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 743-44 (11th Cir. 1989). 
296 888 F.2d at 732. 
297 Id. at 743. 
298 See id. 
299 Id. 
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This principle was developed to an even greater extent in United States 
v. Cavin,30 0 which involved questions of tax and insurance fraud.30' As in 
Kelly, the court held that the exclusion of expert proof concerning the 
defendant attorneys' ethical obligations was reversible error.30 2 It went 
further by noting that "[e]xpert testimony may be particularly appropriate 
when specialized areas of law, such as the insurance and financial matters 
3 °4relevant herein, are at issue. 30 3 Likewise, in UnitedStates v. Kellington, 
where an attorney was accused of obstructing justice by helping his client 
destroy certain documents, the court held he had a duty of loyalty to the 
client as long as he "[did] not affirmatively know his client's objectives to 
0 5be illegal., 3 Given Kellington's defense was based on his ethical 
obligations, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury that the testimony of his expert on legal ethics was 
"merely background information. 30 6 
In practice, the principles outlined in cases such as Cavin and 
Kellington can lead both to procedural and substantive confusion. Needless 
to say, the defendant's ethical expert will be opposed by a prosecution 
expert who will present a competing view of the relevant ethical 
obligations.30 7 Since courts in many jurisdictions are wary of expert 
testimony that might pertain to the ultimate issue before the jury, the use of 
expert testimony in nearly all American jurisdictions is typically subject to 
a threshold showing of acceptance or reliability.30 8 This can lead to a 
3O 39 F.3d 1299 (5th Cir. 1994). 
301 Id.at 1302-04. 
302 Id. at 1309. 
303 Id. The court also noted that the relevant state disciplinary rules and American Bar 
Association opinions were in conflict regarding attorneys' obligations to disclose financial 
frauds by their clients, and thus expert testimony could help guide the trier of fact through 
the process of determining the defendants' mental state. Id. The court noted, for instance, 
that attorneys are required to disclose material facts "when disclosure is necessary to avoid 
assisting in a criminal or fraudulent act by a client," but that an exception to this rule 
occurred where "disclosure is prohibited by the rule against revealing client confidences." 
Given "most such disclosures would consist of client confidences" and the parameters of the 
relevant ethical rules depend in part on the lawyer's role in the reporting process, the 
defendants are entitled to present evidence of how the interplay of the ethical and legal 
obligations influenced their behavior. See id. 
304217 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
305 Id. at 1099. 
306 Id. 
307 See id. at 743 (discussing cases in which the prosecution had introduced expert 
testimony on professional ethics as proof of guilt); see also State v. Larsen, 828 P.2d 487, 
492 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
permitting the prosecutor to present expert testimony on professional ethics). 
308A majority of American jurisdictions, including the federal courts, now follow the 
multifactor test established in Daubertv. MerrellDow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and 
1
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remarkable amount of preliminary litigation in recognition of the effect that 
legal ethics could have on the potential jury.
309 
Even in bench trials and pretrial proceedings before a judge, such 
expert testimony has proven troublesome. For instance, in Marks the trial 
court heard expert testimony and the appellate courts accepted amicus 
curiae arguments concerning the ethical standards to which attorneys are 
held during pre-suit negotiations. 310 The issue of proper negotiating 
behavior was hotly contested during the pretrial proceedings, with the 
Florida Trial Lawyers' Association contending that in pretrial negotiations
'3 "puffing was the norm, and the State Attorney's office arguing that 
failure to exercise complete candor was unethical and fraudulent.1 2 The 
state courts wrestled with this issue to an uncertain conclusion, determining 
that the line between zealous advocacy and fraud was not easy to draw but 
declining to enumerate the particular types of conduct that might fall on 
either side of that line.313 
An attorney disciplinary committee would be familiar with the relevant 
ethical rules, precedents, and opinions, not only in its own state, but also in 
other American jurisdictions. As with other specialized tribunals such as 
workers' compensation boards, civil service boards, or zoning boards of 
appeal, lawyer grievance committees are experts in the area of law they 
administer. 31 4 They would not require guidance from potentially partisan 
outside experts to determine the dividing line between legitimate advocacy 
and insurance fraud, and they would have the expertise and resources to 
determine what attorneys may or may not do. 
The need for a disciplinary buffer is strongest where, as in Marks and 
similar cases, the alleged fraudulent conduct consists of overzealous 
advocacy or withholding of information rather than fabricated claims. 
Advocacy-based charges implicate lawyering practices and are thus targeted 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,526 U.S. 137 (1999). A minority of states still follow the 
Frye standard, which requires that expert opinion be generally accepted within the relevant 
professional field. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Both standards, 
however, require the party proffering the testimony to make a threshold showing. 
309 See United States v. Naegele, 471 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2007) (both sides 
proffered the testimony of legal ethics experts, which led to extensive preliminary litigation 
concerning whether their testimony was sufficiently reliable to admit and whether testimony 
on certain topics should be precluded as invading the province of the jury). 
310 See State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 698 So. 2d 533, 537-38 (Fla. 1997). 
311 Id. at 8. 
312 See Brief of Petitioner on the Merits at 5, No. 85,920, 1995 WL 17016003 (Fla. Jul. 
20, 1995). 
313See State v. Mark Marks, P.A., 758 So. 2d 1131, 1137 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
314See Zacharias, supra note 283, at 690 (noting the expertise of disciplinary boards and 
recognizing that ethical evaluators are usually attorneys). 
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at the very activities the Alliance improperly seeks to chill, while classic 
frauds such as staged accidents do not. For prudential reasons, however, it 
would be advisable to extend the buffer system to all insurance fraud 
charges against attorneys, no matter what the underlying alleged conduct, 
when the charges implicate any in-role conduct. If only certain alleged 
attorney-fraud cases were subject to a buffer, then there would be a risk of 
endless preliminary litigation over whether or not the buffer system applied 
to a particular case or whether it applied to all counts against a specific 
defendant. This would prolong rather than expedite the legal proceedings 
against the attorney, which is itself one of the harms caused by Alliance-
inspired criminal charges,315 and thus would defeat one of the central 
purposes of the proposed buffer. 
There are other and more generalized reasons why disciplinary bodies 
should be permitted to vet insurance fraud charges against lawyers. One 
such reason is that disciplinary tribunals are quasi-judicial rather than 
prosecutorial organs, and thus have no financial or political connection to 
the insurance industry. As has been discussed above, prosecutorial 
agencies are subject to influence by the insurance industry, and even when 
not directly funded by the industry, are often prone to adopt the industry's 
positions on contentious issues. The very essence of the Alliance is that, 
along with preferential legislatively granted access and authority, the 
insurance industry's attitudes and opinions permeate the investigative and 
prosecutorial branches of the criminal justice system, and police and 
prosecutors are tainted with at least the appearance, and often the actuality, 
of advocating for the economic interests of insurance carriers. 
An attorney grievance committee, in contrast, is a body infused with 
impartiality. Instead of using the criminal justice system as a heavy-handed 
method 316 of policing litigation tactics, a disciplinary committee would 
focus on the real issue: whether the attorney's conduct, in light of relevant 
statutes and ethical rules, constituted proper practice. A grievance 
committee is uniquely suited to take an impartial first look at insurance 
companies' allegations against lawyers, investigate such allegations without 
the appearance or reality of financial influence, and serve as expert advisor 
315 See supra notes 190-219 and accompanying text. 
316 The regulation of lawyers by criminal prosecution, in the absence of the opportunity 
to be handled administratively, significantly shifts the power of such regulation from the 
judiciary, ever cognizant of the lawyer's role within the legal process, to the legislature's 
more democratic but potentially more reactionary domain. See Zacharias, supranote 283, at 
726 ("[M]any situations addressed by the professional rules demand flexibility in regulation 
that is not possible under a criminal law model.... [B]y leaving the regulation of the legal 
system in the hands of politicians, society would risk dramatic changes in professional rules 
geared to what is popular rather than what is systemically justified."). 
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to the courts as it considers dismissal of some or all charges based on the 
lawyers' professional conduct. 
In addition, in the majority of jurisdictions, attorney disciplinary 
complaints are private and the information revealed therein is made public 
317 only after a finding of probable cause. A minority of jurisdictions holds 
even the hearings private from the public.3t 8 Thus, if suspected cases of 
insurance fraud are initially handled within the disciplinary system or by a 
process analogous to it, confidentiality could be used to preclude the type of 
high-profile press releases commonly associated with criminal charges 
against lawyers. Even if the rules of adjudication do not currently hold the 
investigations private, the use of the disciplinary agent for this "special 
master" purpose could be done in camera with the transcriptions sealed.319 
The investigation will be conducted in a private and dignified manner with 
respect for the rights of all parties rather than being made the subject of 
damaging media exposure before the charges are levied. In any event, even 
if confidentiality were not maintained, the opportunity for expert evaluation 
of professional conduct alone is useful. 
Moreover, many of the ancillary charges that accompany insurance 
fraud prosecutions are fundamentally ethical or administrative in nature. 
Allegations related to record-keeping or illicit solicitation of clients are 
primarily concerned with the public image of the legal profession and the 
administration of the courts.32° Consequently, they are more appropriately 
weighed by the very agencies charged with policing professional ethics. In 
the American legal system, this is traditionally the role of disciplinary 
committees, whether operated as an arm of the courts or by state bar 
associations under legislative authority. 
317 The fact that these proceedings are not public does not mean they are not available to 
the court. Since disciplinary proceedings are usually seen as a procedure by the court, then 
any ruling they make, would be available to the court. 
318 See Levin, supra note 283, at 1 (noting that "in many jurisdictions, discipline 
complaints, discipline files, and even many discipline sanctions are private"). The level of 
privacy varies state to state, with Florida, New Hampshire, Oregon, and West Virginia 
keeping all or most professional complaints as a part of the public record. Id. at 19. In the 
majority of jurisdictions, the complaint only becomes public record once there has been a 
finding of probable cause. Id. A minority ofjurisdictions prohibit the public from attending 
the disciplinary hearings, even after a finding of probable cause, with information about 
complaints only made public once there has been a finding of wrongdoing and the 
imposition of a public sanction. Id.at 19-20. 
319 Hearings may be held in camera so as not to prejudice a criminal defendant or in the 
interest of attomey-client confidentiality. In California, for example, courts hold the hearing 
on replacement of counsel in camerawith the resulting transcripts sealed. See CAL. RULE OF 
CT. 33.5; People v. Mardsen, 465 P.2d 44 (1970).
320 See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 490-92 (N.Y. 1928). 
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It should be noted that, in the event evidence actually does 
demonstrate fraud, the legitimate rights of prosecutors and insurance 
carriers will be safeguarded. In fraud cases, disciplinary authorities will 
lose little time in making findings against the accused attorneys, and any 
statute of limitations concerns can be addressed by tolling the applicable 
statute for the duration of the disciplinary process. Indeed, where a 
disciplinary board has issued a finding of unethical practice, prosecutors 
will likely face far less difficulty in obtaining guilty pleas or restitution 
from the attorneys at issue. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The assessment of private funds on the insurance industry to assist in 
the prosecution of crimes primarily affecting that industry's interests 
requires that the potential of conflicting interests arising under such a 
system be addressed. Such a system increases the risk that lawyers 
representing interests adverse to the funding industry will come within the 
purview of those funded prosecutorial agencies to their perceived, and 
perhaps actual, detriment. To alleviate fears of "targeting," inappropriate 
influence, and special access, some form of prophylactic measure is 
appropriate. 
The regulation of lawyers as lawyers has long been the traditional 
domain of ethics regulators. By requiring the initial judgment of litigation 
techniques to be assessed by these bodies, or some similar expert hearing 
officer, the risk of chilled advocacy is reduced, if not eliminated. While 
lawyers are not, and should not be, immune from criminal prosecution, the 
nature of their role as advocate should also not be discounted. In the 
absence of such measures, the regulation of lawyers will increasingly 
become the domain of the criminal law and lawyers' tactical judgments 
subject to the scrutiny of the prosecution. Even in the absence of a biased 
prosecutor, such shift in governance is possibly unwise. Given the 
existence of risks to prosecutorial neutrality in the insurance fraud context, 
such a result is most definitely unsound. 
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